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CONTRACTING BLAME 
Eric A. Zacks  
 
This Article explores the impact of the cognitive biases of judges and 
juries in the context of contract preparation and execution.  From rental 
car contracts to mortgage forbearance agreements, contract preparers 
include provisions and formatting characteristics that appear to add little 
to the material terms or understanding of the agreement.  These features, 
however, make perfect sense if one considers the implications of attribution 
theory, which is based on our tendency to attribute blame for an event to 
another’s disposition or personality.  We are predisposed to blame the 
victim, which makes us susceptible to misjudgment when examining 
another’s actions.  This Article makes a novel link between behavioral 
literature and contract preparation and suggests that contract preparers 
may be able to manipulate adjudicators’ cognitive biases systematically.  
Exclusive of the economic bargain, contract provisions can provide 
attributional “clues” about the contracting context that inform and 
reassure judicial interpreters that a particular contracting party is more 
blameworthy than another.  For example, multiple signature blocks, 
boldfaced or highlighted warnings, and recitals depicting a particular 
version of events all reinforce our tendency to perceive the contracting 
party as being able to act freely without being influenced by his or her 
situation.  In counterproductive fashion, however, these features are often 
irrelevant to a party’s decisions in the contracting context.  In light of the 
significant implications of the existence and prospective use of such 
attributional clues for contract law theory and judgment, this Article 
proposes a broader contextual and adjudicative focus when contemplating 
contract law reforms. 
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“What happened, it seems to me, is that of all the indicia which 
determine whether a thing is a contract or not, the most irrelevant—the 
physical appearance of the thing as a thing—turned out to be the most 
powerful.” 
—Arthur Allen Leff
1
 
 
“The secret of life is honesty and fair dealing.  If you can fake that, 
you’ve got it made.” 
—Groucho Marx
2
 
 
 
 1.  Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 147 (1970). 
 2.  N.C. MUNSON, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 154 (2008). 
ZACKS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  3:14 PM 
2012] CONTRACTING BLAME 171 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
BY READING THIS SENTENCE, WHICH IS WRITTEN IN ALL 
CAPITAL LETTERS, YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE 
VOLUNTARILY READ AND UNDERSTOOD THIS ENTIRE 
ARTICLE, INCLUDING ALL 188 FOOTNOTES.  Is the previous 
sentence true?  It is difficult to see how it would be simply by virtue of its 
existence on the page.  Either you will voluntarily read and understand this 
entire Article or you will not, and the inclusion of the first sentence does 
not, in circular fashion, make it true.  As a practical matter, no one reads all 
warnings in uppercase type or, as a more modern example, reads every line 
on every page before clicking to the next on his or her electronic book 
reader.  Nevertheless, contract preparers believe that adjudicators are 
affected by the presence of contract formatting features and contextual 
indicators, and an examination of behavioral literature indicates that they 
may be on to something. 
This Article explores the impact of the cognitive biases of judges and 
juries in the particularly unique context of contract preparation and 
execution.  From rental car contracts to mortgage forbearance agreements, 
contract preparers include provisions and formatting characteristics that 
appear to add little to the material terms or understanding of the agreement.  
These features, however, make perfect sense if one considers the 
implications of attribution theory, which is based on our predisposition to 
attribute blame for an event upon another’s disposition or personality.  We 
tend to blame the victim, for example, which makes us susceptible to 
misjudgment when examining another’s actions.  This Article makes a 
novel link between behavioral literature and contract preparation and 
suggests that contract preparers may be able to manipulate adjudicators’ 
cognitive biases systematically.  Exclusive of the economic bargain, 
contract provisions can provide attributional “clues” that inform and 
reassure judicial interpreters that a particular contracting party is more 
blameworthy than another.  The contract, in other words, can depict a 
particular contracting context, which can affect our judgment as to the 
blameworthiness of the parties. 
For example, multiple signature blocks, boldfaced or highlighted 
warnings, and recitals describing a particular version of events all reinforce 
our tendency to perceive the contracting party as being able to act freely, 
uninfluenced by his or her situation.  In counterproductive fashion, 
however, these provisions or features are often irrelevant to a party’s 
decision in the contracting context.  Behavioral research shows, for 
example, that contract warnings or disclosures are largely ignored by 
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contracting parties.  The number of signature blocks in a rental car contract 
similarly is irrelevant to the decisions made in the contracting context in 
which the renter finds himself.  Nevertheless, many contracts appear to 
reflect an awareness, conscious or not, that judicial scrutiny of the contracts 
will be largely based on an ex post attribution analysis—however flawed—
of the contracting context.  More problematically, certain contract law 
reforms support or, in some instances, mandate such features. 
Regardless of whether one believes that different situations impact our 
contracting behavior, we should resist attempts by a powerful party to 
falsely represent the contracting context.  Thus, because certain contractual 
features appear to contemplate ex post review and the presentation of a 
particular contracting context, we need more complete and nuanced 
reactions and responses to such features.  As with the differing 
explanations for behavior, our responses can be compared and contrasted 
with one another based on the differing underlying beliefs in the power of 
the contracting environment.  We thus blame the signer of a contract with 
respect to all contracting decisions, even though the signer may be 
contracting under a number of powerful situational influences.  We have a 
tendency to blame the victim in retrospect, and the contract preparers 
“assist” us in doing so by presenting contracts that reinforce the other 
party’s blameworthiness. 
Section I of this Article provides an introduction to attribution theory 
and its applicability to decision-making issues for both executive actors 
(actors who are making decisions for themselves, such as contract signers) 
and adjudicative actors (actors who are assessing the decisions made by 
themselves or someone else, such as judges and juries).  Section II 
critically analyzes how an understanding of attribution theory can be 
utilized by contract preparers on an ex ante basis to obtain particular results 
under contract law.  Section III of this Article addresses possible responses 
to this critique.  In Section IV, I suggest some possible implications of, and 
suggestions for, a more nuanced understanding of attribution theory’s role 
in contract law.  The last Section of this Article concludes that if a more 
complete understanding of the contract context and its manipulability (both 
for executive actors and adjudicative actors) is not achieved, the 
effectiveness of contract law reforms may be significantly diminished. 
I. ADJUDICATION AND SITUATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
A. Explaining Bad Outcomes 
The fundamental attribution error, or correspondence bias, describes 
the error individuals make when determining the cause of behavior, both 
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their own and that of others.
3
  As outsiders examining others’ choices, we 
tend to conclude that the cause of the others’ choices and resulting negative 
outcomes were internal and intrinsic to the other person, while we 
generally attribute negative events that happen to us to situational and other 
influences external to ourselves.
4
  We generally believe, in other words, 
that bad results arise from bad people and we ignore or are oblivious to 
mitigating situational factors.
5
  We also are “too slow to revise our 
 
 3.  LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES 
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 4 (1991) (describing the fundamental attribution error as 
“[p]eople’s inflated belief in the importance of personality traits and dispositions, together 
with their failure to recognize the importance of situational factors in affecting behavior”); 
Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors Think About 
Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 127 (1995) (“[T]he 
‘fundamental attribution error’ [is] the tendency inappropriately to attribute the behavior of 
another person to her corresponding dispositions or traits (i.e., ‘the sort of person she is’) 
rather than to the circumstances in which she finds herself, including role demands.”) (citing 
Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins 
and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 135–40 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)); Roger C. Park, 
Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 738 (1998) (noting that the error 
“causes human decision-makers to attribute too much importance to dispositions, and to 
overlook situational influences”); David C. Funder, Errors and Mistakes: Evaluating the 
Accuracy of Social Judgment, 101 PSYCHOL. BULL. 75, 78 (1987) (“This error is the putative 
tendency for people to overestimate the influence of attitudes and personality on behavior, 
and to underestimate the power of the situation.  It is typically demonstrated by experiments 
that show how subjects will draw inferences about the personalities of rating targets on the 
basis of insufficient information.”) (citation omitted). 
 4.  Feigenson, supra note 3, at 86 (“People tend to attribute other people’s behavior 
and its (negative) consequences to those people’s enduring dispositions or traits, while 
attributing their own behavior and its (negative) consequences to the circumstances.  In 
other words, ‘I acted as I did because anyone in that situation would have behaved similarly; 
but he acted as he did because he is that kind of guy.’”); Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. 
Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21, 21 (1995) (“When people 
observe behavior, they often conclude that the person who performed the behavior was 
predisposed to do so—that the person’s behavior corresponds to the person’s unique 
dispositions—and they draw such conclusions even when a logical analysis suggests they 
should not.”); Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A 
Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 402-03 (2003) (“Attribution theory has many 
facets, but of immediate concern to us are jurors’ tendencies (a) to assume that bad results 
are caused by people’s actions, and (b) to attribute causation on the basis of the parties’ 
perceived personal dispositions.”) (citation omitted). 
 5.  Prentice, supra note 4, at 404 (“Personal factors tend to drift to the fore, whereas 
situational factors tend to fade into the background.”); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, 
Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and 
Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1444 (1983) (explaining one example of the 
fundamental error is “to attribute an honest act to an honest disposition rather than to the 
presence of factors that encourage honesty such as the monitoring of behavior or the need 
for the approval of others”); Gilbert & Malone, supra note 4, at 22 (“[W]hen people do 
precisely what the physical environment or the social situation demands, dispositional 
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hypotheses in response to new evidence, too confident in the correctness of 
our judgments in many settings, and too quick to lose faith in genuinely 
diagnostic evidence when that evidence is embedded among irrelevant or 
distractor variables.”
6
 
Thus, with respect to assessing contract choices and contract 
outcomes, judges and juries are inclined to blame the contracting “victim” 
and that person’s disposition for the poor choice or outcome rather than any 
situational influences.
7
  This is particularly instructive in the consumer 
contract context.  For example, very few persons read consumer contracts 
such as rental car agreements, even though those contracts often contain 
unfavorable clauses one may resist if known.
8
  The renter’s behavior in that 
situation is subject to many interpretations, ranging from those citing the 
renter as an irrational actor who can be manipulated to others believing the 
renter is a rationally ignorant actor who logically chooses not to read the 
contract.
9
  For purposes of this Article, however, the focus primarily is on 
 
inferences are logically unwarranted.  This simple rule is eminently reasonable, but, as with 
the interstate speed limit, someone seems to have neglected to tell the drivers.”). 
 6.  Philip E. Tetlock, An Alternative Metaphor in the Study of Judgment and Choice: 
People as Politicians, 1 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 451, 453 (1991) (citations omitted). 
 7.  Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 569, 569 (1998) (“We are ingenious in ‘discovering’ the 
defect of character we believe would account for a person’s misfortune.”) (quoting Antoine 
Arnauld, THE ART OF THINKING: PORT-ROYAL LOGIC 285 (1964)); Jon Hanson & David 
Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, 
Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 333 (2003) (noting that 
“people systematically—and often quite erroneously—attribute causation, responsibility, 
and blame to the most visible actors in a given situation,” which is compounded by 
mistakenly “assuming that action is attributable to disposition, rather than situation.”); 
Tetlock, supra note 6, at 464 (“People prefer dispositional explanations because such 
explanations typically come first to mind, and people rarely consider less obvious situational 
ones.”). 
 8.  Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of 
Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1269 (1993) (“It is no secret that 
consumers neither read nor understand standard form contracts.”); Edith R. Warkentine, 
Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing Assent” as the Basis for 
Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 
469 (2008) (“People who sign standard form contracts rarely read them.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 9.  See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of 
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 243 (1995) (“Faced with preprinted terms whose effect the 
form taker knows he will find difficult or impossible to fully understand, which involve 
risks that probably will never mature, which are unlikely to be worth the cost of search and 
processing, and which probably aren’t subject to revision in any event, a rational form taker 
will typically decide to remain ignorant of the preprinted terms.”); Michael I. Meyerson, The 
Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. 
REV. 583, 601 (1990) (“Thus, the benefit to be derived from acquiring adequate knowledge 
of contract terms is usually low and is likely to be far exceeded by the significant costs of 
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how the adjudicators, rather than the actors themselves, may react to a 
“bad” or apparently unfair contractual outcome.  Attribution theory 
suggests that we may tend to blame a poor contractual outcome on the actor 
herself rather than the contract process or situation, or more fundamentally, 
that the contract process or situation may be ignored or deemed irrelevant 
when deciding whom to “blame.”
10
 
Further, knowledge of adjudicators’ fundamental attribution error 
encourages contract preparers to construct contracts that will take 
advantage of the error.
11
  Just as sellers of products and services “will 
respond to market incentives by manipulating consumer perceptions in 
whatever manner maximizes profits,” we should expect sellers to respond 
to the same market incentives to prepare contracts to manipulate ex post 
reaction and increase profits.
12
  Thus, our ex post judgment heuristics lead 
to a trilogy of problems, namely, that such heuristics result in biases and 
errors, the adjudicative actors (judges or juries) are likely to be unable to 
recognize their own biases and errors, and such heuristics, being 
susceptible to bias and error, can and will result in the manipulation of their 
reactions to the contractual situation.
13
 
 
acquiring that information.  It is, therefore, rational for even a conscientious consumer to 
pay little, if any, attention to subordinate contract terms.”); Prentice, supra note 4, at 359–60 
(discussing the information costs involved with reading and understanding all contracts, 
which suggests that it may in certain instances be irrational to attempt to become completely 
informed). 
 10.  Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 7, at 333 (noting that “[j]udges, juries, and 
legislators are as vulnerable to these cognitive biases as anyone else”); Jon Hanson & David 
Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 
93 GEO. L.J. 1, 135 (2004) (suggesting that “judicial attributions will be far too 
dispositionist . . . . Where harms are caused by situational influences, the law will tend 
either to seek out and name a dispositional scapegoat on which to place responsibility, or to 
deny that there was a harm (perhaps by derogating the victim) or the possibility of a legal 
remedy.”) (citation omitted). 
 11.  It has been suggested that, because of dispositionism, “by promoting a lopsided 
worldview, based on individual stable preferences and autonomous individual choices, 
corporations can actually curtail individual autonomy and alter perceived preferences.”  
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 7, at 229.  See generally Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, 
Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 1420 (1999) (describing the manipulation of consumer behavior biases by companies 
to lower consumer perception of product risks).  This Article suggests that not only are 
consumers and other contracting parties manipulated, but that adjudicators can be and likely 
are as well. 
 12.  Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem 
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 743 (1999). 
 13.  Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 10, at 39–40; see also Tetlock, supra note 6, at 453 
(noting that “[p]eople, it is widely agreed, are limited-capacity information processors who 
rely on inferential shortcuts to help them make sense of an otherwise impossibly complex 
environment and to make otherwise hopelessly difficult decisions. . . . The price of cognitive 
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B. Situational Decision-Making 
If we return to the typical rental car scenario as an example of a 
contracting situation, imagine that the renter is presented with a form 
contract by the rental car agent.  The renter is perhaps a traveler who has 
just arrived in the airport or city where the rental agency is located.  Other 
customers were just served ahead of the renter, resulting in the renter 
having to wait before being assisted by the rental car service agent.  Other 
customers also are in line waiting behind the renter to meet with the rental 
car agent and appear to be impatient.  The rental car agent does not have, or 
appear to have, the authority to modify the contract if the renter were to 
question or propose a change to a provision.
14
  The rental car agent then 
highlights or marks where the renter is required to sign or initial the rental 
car contract, with little or very basic explanation.  The renter had never 
seen a customer negotiate or attempt to negotiate changes to the rental car 
contract.  The customer thus signs the contract as and where instructed 
after, at most, confirming the rental rate, rental term, and insurance choice. 
All of the above contracting behavior can be accounted for through 
behavioral theories that examine the processes and heuristics used by 
individuals when making decisions.  For example, the status quo bias 
provides one reason that the renter may accept the form contract as 
presented.  The status quo bias describes the tendency of individuals to 
prefer the status quo (the contract as presented) even if the status quo does 
not efficiently allocate rights—in this case, through the inclusion of 
contractual terms that do not necessarily reflect what the parties would 
have agreed to had they negotiated them exhaustively.
15
  In addition, the 
 
economy, in this view, is increased susceptibility to error and bias.”). 
 14.  Meyerson, supra note 8, at 1270 (“Additionally, because consume[rs] know that 
the agent behind the counter is not authorized to rewrite the contract, they conclude that 
there is little to be gained from reading a non-negotiable contract.”) (citation omitted); Todd 
D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 
1225 (1983) (“Customers know well enough that they cannot alter any individual firm’s 
standard document. . . . If they do not [understand the take-it-or-leave it nature of the 
agreement], and if they attempt to bargain the form terms, the salesman will explain his lack 
of authority to vary the form.”);  see also Prentice, supra note 4, at 372–73 (explaining the 
appearance of a lack of authority to bargain and further expecting that most “form takers . . . 
would likely give up after being told that the agent had no authority to alter [the form 
documents], that the forms came from the lawyers and could not be changed, or that an 
exception could not be made just for this particular [form taker].”) (citation omitted). 
 15.  Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The 
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1584 
(1998)) (“[T]he ‘endowment effect,’ . . . suggests that the initial allocation of legal 
entitlements can affect preferences for those entitlements.  The consequence is that 
completely alienable legal entitlements will be ‘sticky’—that is, t[e]nd not to be traded—
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contract’s preprinted nature and official and legal appearance increases the 
likelihood the renter will defer to it as written.
16
  Similarly, individuals 
often rely on social proof when acting in particular situations.
17
  Thus, if no 
one reads rental car contracts, or, at least, if one perceives that no one else 
reads such contracts, as may be perceived by the renter while waiting in 
line at the rental car center, then one is unlikely to challenge the 
community consensus on the contracting process.
18
  The unknown and 
potentially high costs and uncertain benefits of negotiating and seeking 
alternative arrangements also deter negotiation, particularly with respect to 
terms that may not have been addressed in the rental car reservation (such 
as terms other than car type, rental price and rental period).
19
  Our 
preference to end up in a worse situation through inaction (accepting the 
contract as written) rather than through action (negotiating or seeking 
alternative arrangements) also explains an individual’s inclination to accept 
the rental contract as presented.
20
  A renter’s optimism bias, which is the 
tendency of an individual to underestimate the risks involved with a 
particular activity in which the individual is engaged, may also lead the 
renter to believe that nothing “bad” is likely to happen during the rental 
period and forego negotiating any particular contingent or unfavorable 
contractual terms.
21
 
 
even when such stickiness cannot be explained by transaction costs.”); Robert L. Scharff & 
Francesco Parisi, The Role of Status Quo Bias and Bayesian Learning in the Creation of 
New Legal Rights, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 25, 26 (2006) (“Status quo bias exists when 
decision makers choose to remain with the status quo more often than traditional economic 
theory would suggest.”) (citation omitted). 
 16.  Prentice, supra note 4, at 372. 
 17.  SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING 201–02 
(1993) (describing conformity effects). 
 18.  Id. at 200–04 (describing an experiment where people were influenced in their 
conclusions based on the answers given by their co-participants).  Plous explains that “most 
people rendered at least some judgments that contradicted the evidence of their senses, and 
many conformed on the majority of trials.”  Id. at 201; see also Prentice, supra note 4, at 
373 (discussing how social proof suggests a reason that people will not challenge broker 
form contracts as presented to them). 
 19.  Meyerson, supra note 9, at 600. 
 20.  Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the 
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1224 (2003) (describing “the 
tendency to care much more about errors of commission than about errors of omission, even 
when there is no obvious normative reason to draw a distinction.”) (citation omitted). 
 21.  Prentice, supra note 4, at 362.  Interestingly, when a poor outcome occurs, our 
optimism bias may be replaced with self-blame in the presence of a contract, even when the 
contract’s terms (such as an exculpatory clause) may not be enforceable.  See Tess 
Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathon Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of 
Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405, 410 (2009) (explaining that exculpatory 
language in contracts, even if legally unenforceable, has a deterrent effect on the likelihood 
that a party will seek compensation). 
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C. Ignoring the Situation When Adjudicating 
Contract law has largely ignored the “situation” of contracting.  
Theories of contract law traditionally were premised on the idea of an 
individual’s autonomy.  Without the ability to act freely on one’s behalf, it 
would not appear logical or equitable to hold one accountable for his or her 
contracting behavior.  This is because autonomy “provides the very basis of 
moral authority for the principle of contractual obligation.”
22
  Our wills, 
however, only yield to the most “salient kinds of situations, and not 
necessarily the most powerful,” such as physically compelled assent or 
improper physical threats that would constitute duress.
23
  In other words, 
we may only recognize the power of the “situation” where the threatening 
situation was “not only extremely conspicuous, but where the element of 
choice was also clear.”
24
 
By focusing on a situation where the power of the situation is 
undisputed and the lack of choice is clear, we may be unable or unwilling 
to imagine less extreme situations that have similar effects, or more plainly, 
that the situation always is important to decisions and the existence of 
choice.
25
  The starting and ending point of dispositionism can result in an 
“abdication of any realistic inquiry into the basic forces shaping our own 
behavior beyond what common sense and our intuitions will provide,” 
suggesting that the inquiry is unlikely to arise in a contract situation, 
particularly one in which the written contract provides the dispositional 
“clues” that the adjudicator expects and probably desires.
26
 
As seen in Section B above, a number of situational influences can 
explain why the rental car customer made the promises in, or consented to 
the terms of, the rental car contract as presented.  What is noteworthy at 
this point, however, is that these situational influences are likely ignored by 
ex post adjudicators engaged in the process of assigning blame for a poor 
contractual outcome, which in turn impacts legal conclusions regarding the 
contract’s effect.
27
  There are several behavioral biases that contribute to 
 
 22.  Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 7, at 288. 
 23.  Id. at 289. 
 24.  Id. at 290. 
 25.  Id. at 290–91 (“This dispositionism blinds the [promise] theory to the enormous 
power of the situation.  It ignores the fact that situation shapes the very thoughts and 
behavior that manifest as the choices Fried crowns with a dispositionist presumption.”). 
 26.  Id. at 292 (citation omitted). 
 27.  See Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of 
Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 576 (1999) 
(observing that “[t]he classical ideal of ‘freedom of contract’ depends entirely on an 
obviously unrealistic model of contract formation where all transactions are negotiated by 
sophisticated, fully-informed parties of equal bargaining power, capable of protecting their 
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the tendency to blame others’ internal or intrinsic nature rather than 
examining situational influences.
28
 
Consequently, we attribute the renter’s poor contractual outcome to 
her intelligence, hastiness, or other personality factor, in particular if the 
contract succeeds in portraying the contracting context as being free of 
situational pressures.
29
  Indeed, our “assumption of rationality also allows 
the judge or observer to marginalize the behavior of victims who act 
foolishly, condemning them to their deserved fate.”
30
 
Moreover, how the act is presented to us is particularly important to 
how we determine its cause.
31
  If, as the result of framing, the execution of 
the contract is perceived to be the “deviant” act, then we should expect an 
ex post attribution of blame to the party who executed the contract (and 
who may be complaining of situational pressures and a lack of consent).
32
  
Most importantly, we will not question our dispositionist belief that the 
renter had significant influence over the contract, including its terms, 
negotiation and execution.
33
  Section II infra will explore in more depth the 
 
self interests and of arriving at mutually beneficial agreements that will maximize utility for 
both parties. . . . Unfortunately, this model and its underlying assumptions do not reflect 
reality.”) (citation omitted). 
 28.  These biases arise from the way in which we process information and make 
judgments, which psychology suggests is based on the use of knowledge structures and 
judgmental heuristics.  Feigenson, supra note 3, at 87–88.  Knowledge structures provide 
reference points so that new information can be classified and easily understood, while 
judgmental heuristics assist a person in filling “gaps” in information, so that the information 
provided can be used to make a judgment or classification.  Id. at 87–90. 
 29.  Feigenson, supra note 3, at 127; Gilbert & Malone, supra note 4, at 25 (“[O]nly 
when people observe behavior that is more extreme than the situation leads them to expect 
do they make dispositional inferences about the actor.”). 
 30.  Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from 
Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 
627, 699 n.213 (1996). 
 31.  Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 10, at 42, 43 (noting that “the way in which an issue 
is presented to us significantly influences how we perceive it. . . . . ‘[F]raming’ is one 
identified piece of the manipulable situation.”).  Of course, this same presentation affects 
contracting parties’ perceptions as well, which suggests that our reaction to a contract can be 
influenced, for example, if the agent presents it to us with an oral statement that “this is just 
boilerplate” (or, conversely, “this is important”).  See Prentice, supra note 4, at 377 n.218 
(noting that our risk perception can be lowered based on presentation or framing). 
 32.  Gilbert & Malone, supra note 4, at 25. 
 33.  Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 10, at 9 (“[E]conomists in general and legal 
economists in particular have indeed applied dispositionist assumptions unflinchingly—that 
is, without the self-suspicion and rigorous inspection that social science would demand. . . . 
because their dispositionist assumptions seem so intuitively plausible, and so fundamental to 
our sense of ourselves, that they are beyond question.”).  Similarly, we may not question the 
continued contractual presentation of the contract’s context to the extent it reinforces our 
pre-existing beliefs regarding the free choice being made in almost every instance.  For 
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extent to which this dispositionist belief can be reinforced by the terms of 
the written contract itself.
34
  As with other judgments and attributions of 
blame, this Article asserts that judgments regarding contracting context can 
be manipulated by including in advance contractual provisions designed to 
serve such purposes.
35
 
II. PROSPECTIVE ATTRIBUTIONAL CONTRACTING:  ARE 
ADJUDICATORS BEING MANIPULATED? 
If ordinary situational factors matter for decision-making purposes but 
are irrelevant or downplayed for adjudication purposes, then the powerful 
party within the contracting context has a number of options.  First, on an 
ex ante basis, the powerful party will be able to create a fairly oppressive 
contract bargaining environment without fear of repercussion.  We should 
expect repeat consumer contract transactions to occur within a framework 
that provides very little opportunity for negotiation.  Indeed, with respect to 
mortgage, credit card, and other consumer transactions, contracts are 
provided within a context where it is unlikely that provisions will be read 
or resisted.
36
  Companies may in fact be required to prepare contracts in 
 
example, in the website contract context, Woodrow Hartzog has argued that courts routinely 
ignore website design and features and limit their review to the boilerplate terms, even 
though website design and features “are capable of conveying a promise of privacy and 
inducing user reliance” and may contain “elements that can interfere with contract 
formation.”  Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1670 
(2011). 
 34.  In other contexts, it has been noted that dispositionist beliefs influence our reaction 
to accidents outside the contract context.  For example, in the famous McDonald’s coffee 
burn case, many people were inclined to blame the victim as being responsible for the burns.  
It was only after a review of the context of the burn, such as McDonald’s corporate policy 
regarding previous coffee temperature complaints and the actual temperature of the coffee, 
that jurors determined that McDonald’s also was responsible for the accident.  See Hanson 
& Yosifon, supra note 7, at 335 n.714. 
 35.  Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 10, at 67 (noting that “[w]hether we perceive a 
person to be in ‘control’ or to have acted ‘intentionally’ are matters that can be framed and 
promoted”).  This effect may even be exaggerated in those instances where the adjudicator 
has a wider range of remedies and more flexibility in adjudicative procedure, such as is 
sometimes the case in arbitration. 
 36.  See generally Duncan MacDonald, The Story of a Famous Promissory Note, 10 
SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 79, 89 (2006) (“Disclosure overload has made plain language an 
impossible exercise.  In the name of consumer protection, government has erected a regime 
guaranteeing that consumers will never read bank documents, except through the expensive 
eyes of a lawyer.”); Prentice, supra at note 4, at 358–60 (discussing the situational and other 
reasons that investors do not typically read prospectuses or other investment agreements); 
Eric A. Zacks, Unstacking the Deck? Contract Manipulation and Credit Card 
Accountability, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471, 1474–76 (2010) (discussing the context that results 
in most consumers not reading credit card agreements).  But see Warkentine, supra note 8, 
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such a manner in order to remain competitive in the marketplace.
37
 
More importantly for this Article, the powerful party can create a 
contract that reinforces the adjudicators’ behavioral biases and 
dispositionist beliefs.  That is, although it may have been executed in a 
relatively inflexible contracting context, the contract itself can create the 
appearance of a flexible context.  It is logical for contract preparers to 
respond to the behavioral biases of adjudicators, just as they may be 
expected to respond to court rulings with respect to the preparation of 
contracts.
38
  As with the inclusion of oppressive terms, they may be 
required by the marketplace to do so.
39
  With the increasing understanding 
of adjudicators’ behavior, not to mention the marketing expertise of 
sophisticated corporate actors, we should expect contractual features that 
reinforce the adjudicators’ anchoring beliefs that (i) the victim is 
responsible in the present situation in which the parties find themselves 
(e.g., whether for the damages suffered or other liabilities or obligations 
under the contract), and (ii) there were no manipulating situational factors 
that should impact the belief under (i).
40
  The contract may present to the 
adjudicator “the ingredients of autonomous, volitional, preference-
satisfying disposition,” which would suggest victim sophistication and 
culpability.
41
  Moreover, we should expect contractual features that cause 
 
at 545 (describing the Washington legal requirement that any contractual exclusion of 
remedies has to be specifically negotiated in certain situations). 
 37.  See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 12, at 747 (reasoning that “[i]ndeed, flipping 
Friedman’s classic justification of the rational actor model, one might say that the 
evolutionary forces of the market will force the parties in the dominant position to behave 
‘as if’ they know and understand how best to use the teachings of the behavioral literature to 
manipulate other actors for gain. . . . Manufacturers, to survive, must behave ‘as if’ they are 
attempting to manipulate consumer risk perceptions.  And in light of the immense power of 
the market forces driving these attempts, it seems highly doubtful that manufacturer 
strategies (be they deliberate or accidental) will fail.”) (emphasis added). 
 38.  Meyerson, supra note 9, at 622 (noting how court decisions are “available to guide 
future contracting parties and reduce contract transaction costs.”) (citation omitted). 
 39.  Hanson & Kysar, supra note 12, at 747; see also Hanson & Kysar, supra note 11, 
at 1422 (suggesting that particular pricing practices, designed to manipulate consumer 
purchasing, illustrate “the potential of manipulative manufacturer tactics to outpace the 
understanding of behavioral researchers. . . .”). 
 40.  Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 7, at 246 (noting the widespread corporate practice 
of presenting the consumer as “nobody’s fool”).  In the consumer product context, “an 
important reason that sellers might embrace and encourage dispositionism is their hope of 
shifting responsibility and avoiding costly regulation or liability.”  Id. at 248. 
 41.  Id.  It has been noted that “[i]n the new formalism, sophisticated parties are held to 
a different set of rules, grounded in freedom of contract.”  Meredith R. Miller, Contract 
Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO. L. REV. 493, 495 (2010) 
(citation omitted).  The “new formalism” is evidenced by the reliance of the bargain 
principle, the reluctance of courts to interfere with the substance of the parties’ contract and 
the prominence of literalism.  Id. at 500.  Miller, however, suggests that courts do not 
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the contracting victim to believe that the victim is responsible for an 
undesirable outcome or event. 
Finally, the behavioral biases described above are mixed with the 
pervasive norm of contract as moral promise.
42
  Viewing the voluntary 
contract as a moral social convention helps explain why people also are 
likely to judge those who breach contracts harshly.
43
  To the extent that an 
adjudicator, particularly a public adjudicator, believes that the contract’s 
execution or breach is a moral issue, the adjudicator should “be more 
motivated to hold others responsible and to reject situational explanations 
or excuses.”
44
  Thus, people tend to judge others more harshly based on the 
“moral culpability” in a particular contract situation.
45
  Again, framing a 
 
engage in a “serious attempt” to explain who is sophisticated.  Id. at 518.  If this is true, then 
contract preparers may be able to manipulate these weak attempts through a particular 
contractual presentation of party sophistication.  See id. at 529–35 (describing and 
advocating a preferred “principled and reflective approach” to ascertaining party 
sophistication). 
 42.  Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 21, at 405, 406 (noting how “[m]ost people 
agree that breaking a promise is immoral,” and demonstrating that “people are quite 
sensitive to the moral dimensions of a breach of contract.”).  It should be noted at this point 
that this Article primarily focuses on the contractual presentation of consent and contracting 
context issues rather than the contractual presentation of particular “deal” terms (such as 
price or the contract subject matter).  There is not a bright line, admittedly, between terms 
that may be deemed “material” to the transaction and may be considered “deal” points and 
those that are purely “contextual” in nature.  In addition, the same behavioral critique of 
contractual context presentation presented in this Article can be extended to deal term 
presentation as well.  For purposes of this Article, however, I have chosen to focus on the 
former because it provides perhaps the clearest example of ex ante manipulation of ex post 
adjudicative biases; that is, while the presentation of “deal” terms is important for both 
contracting and adjudicative parties, the presentation of contracting context is important 
only for adjudicative parties (the party that did not prepare the contract usually does not 
have a “stake” in how consent or the contracting context is presented).  Certainly, we should 
be concerned about the manipulation of judicial interpretation of “deal” terms or terms that 
may directly relate to or influence damage calculations.  I am thankful for Meredith Miller’s 
helpful comments regarding how to think about this cloudy distinction. 
 43.  Tetlock, supra note 6, at 469 (noting how “people are not only expected to act in 
accord with prevailing norms, they also are expected to censure those who violate norms”) 
(citation omitted); Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 21, at 409 (predicting that “people 
hold such strong beliefs about the moral rules of promise and contract that they will use 
these rules to inform their legal decision making”). 
 44.  Tetlock, supra note 6, at 469; see also Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 21, at 
423 (discussing the impact of the moral element of contract upon outside observers, who in 
the context of the authors’ experiment, “thought that the parties were morally bound by the 
specific language of the contract, even when contract law says that the exculpatory clause is 
unenforceable or that the promisor can pay rather than perform.”). 
 45.  Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 21, at 406-07.  Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron 
note that their experimental results suggesting the importance of moral intuitions to legal 
judgments about contracts is impactful not only in the damages situation but also for 
“practical legal matters, including bargaining during contract drafting . . . .”  Id. at 423. 
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contract in moral terms may have an effect on the adjudicator’s 
interpretation and enforcement of the contract. 
The subsections below explore the ways in which the written contract 
can impact, manipulated or not, our ex post reaction to the contracting 
actors and contractual outcomes. 
A. Prototype Theory:  Written Contract as a Prototype 
Prototype theory suggests that people organize their knowledge 
loosely around prototypes (such as a prime or best example of a particular 
category) when making judgments or decisions.
46
  Possessing a prototype 
permits individuals to compare “features of the person or event to the 
characteristics of the prototype” and thereby “classify the person or event 
as a member of the category if it sufficiently resembles or corresponds to 
the prototype.”
47
 
Prototype theory may have implications for contract law adjudication 
in a few areas.  First, when examining a contract, judges or juries may 
compare the contract to the prototypical contract in their mind.  If the 
contract conforms (e.g., if the contract has a signature block and a 
signature) to the prototypical “legal” contract, then we would expect judges 
and juries to enforce the contracts as written.  If that is true, then the 
contract itself (rather than the contracting situation) becomes the most 
important factor.  Thus, we can expect contracts, as prepared by repeat 
players or the more powerful contracting party, to omit terms that could 
raise concerns in the minds of adjudicators as to whether the contract 
deviates from the “prototype.”  Many may believe, for example, that the 
prototypical contract should contain sufficient disclosure of material terms 
 
 46.  Feigenson, supra note 3, at 93. 
 47.  Id.  It should be noted that the exact causal mechanism associated with prototype 
effects is disputed.  See Steven L. Winter, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 
83–89 (2001).  It may be, for example, that a different model of cognition can account for 
the existence of “prototype effects,” and that prototype theory is too limited in its cognitive 
focus on a particular prototype.  For example, Winter describes the “idealized cognitive 
model” (ICM), which is described as a “‘folk’ theory or cultural understanding that 
organizes knowledge of events, people, objects, and their characteristic relationships in a 
single gestalt structure that is experientially meaningful as a whole.”  Id. at 88.  If such 
alternate models can better account for the existence of prototype effects, then whether 
contractual presentation influences or could influence our cognitive processes and schema 
according to such models would need to be separately considered.  In any event, the 
purposeful presentation of a particular contractual prototype presumably would not be 
inconsistent with an ICM (by representing the “set of default assumptions operative within a 
culture,” in this instance regarding contracts) or this Article’s underlying argument about the 
desire to present a particular “consent” or “context” story to the adjudicator.  Id. at 89.  I am 
grateful to Steven Winter for his helpful comments and suggestions regarding the foregoing. 
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and indicate that the contracting party understood the terms to which she 
was agreeing in the contract.  Another example is having the contracting 
party sign in multiple places, particularly with respect to material terms.  
Indeed, rental car contracts and mortgages often have multiple signature 
lines within the contract, in each instance next to a material term.  Upon 
examination by the adjudicator, it then would be difficult to see how such 
contract deviates from the “prototypical” contract. 
Note, however, that the existence of these multiple signature blocks 
does not in any way alleviate any of the situational pressures of the rental 
car contracting situation that generally result in little or no bargaining.  Put 
another way, contracting parties can take advantage of adjudicators’ 
knowledge structures by creating contracts that conform to the prototype 
without actually modifying the contract situation for the contracting party.  
This does not mean that an adjudicator’s decision based on conformance to 
a prototypical contract is incorrect.  In fact, given contract law’s emphasis 
on objective manifestations of assent, the most efficient manner by which 
to ascertain whether consent has been manifested may be to reason by 
comparison (e.g., by assessing whether the contract contains features that 
one would expect, based on experience with “fair” contracts, and which 
suggest assent) instead of viewing the particular contract in isolation or 
trying to envision an ideal contract “from scratch.”  If the common law rule 
is based upon the objective manifestation of assent, it may be difficult to 
determine whether there has been such a manifestation if one did not have 
reference to a model or prototype.  One obviously cannot accurately 
determine whether a manifestation exists without knowing what a 
manifestation looks like.  Prototypes thus assist adjudicators in making 
particular factual or legal conclusions. 
The issue for our purposes is that the format may, in some sense, be 
rigged.  Contract law theory suggests that objective manifestations are 
important and need to be respected, in part because it would be inequitable 
for someone to rely on another’s objective manifestation only to suffer 
damage because the other’s subjective intentions did not match his 
objective manifestation.
48
  For purposes of examining a contracting party’s 
 
 48.  E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 209 (2004) (noting that 
“[a]ccording to the objectivists, a party’s mental assent was not necessary to make a 
contract.  After all, was not contract law intended to protect reasonable expectations?  If one 
party’s actions, judged by a standard of reasonableness, manifested to the other party an 
intention to agree, the real but unexpressed state of the first party’s mind was irrelevant.”); 
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 300 (1986) (“[I]n 
sum, legal enforcement is morally justified because the promisor voluntarily performed acts 
that conveyed her intention to create a legally enforceable obligation by transferring 
alienable rights.”).  Even under a more realist approach, we are seeking the “discovery of 
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manifestations of assent, however, the contract may be the most important 
indicator of such a manifestation, even if that indicator does not explicitly 
indicate “who” is telling the “contract story.”  Thus, the written contract 
itself can make it practically impossible to rebut the presumption of 
enforceability.  Again, by reinforcing the “objective manifestation of 
assent” and without changing the contract context or affecting contracting 
behavior, we may find it difficult to deny or to envision denying the 
enforceability of a contract. 
This last assertion cannot be overstated.  If our ex post perceptions of 
the indicia of contract can be manipulated without affecting the contract 
context or contracting parties’ understanding or contracting behavior, then 
the utility of such indicia is called into question.  If, for example, additional 
signature blocks do not in fact change whether car renters understand or 
negotiate the contracts, then citing additional signature blocks as evidence 
after the fact that the car renters made the promise or consented (and knew 
what they were signing) is somewhat unconvincing unless other relevant 
contextual evidence may be presented.  The additional signature blocks 
may support such a conclusion, but they also very well may not. 
The written contract is, in this manner, used not only to provide 
substantial evidence of the assent and agreement of the parties, but also as 
the primary evidence of the contracting context.  If you signed a contract in 
multiple places, so the argument proceeds, the context in which you signed 
was fair and non-coercive, as the opportunity was available to you at each 
signature block to walk away from the contract.  Although the context may 
in fact have been different, the above conclusion is the only one allowable 
when evidence of context can be presented only within the contract itself.  
If the context is different from that presented in the written contract, 
evidence relevant to the context should not necessarily be excluded or de-
emphasized if it pertains to the contextual issue being presented. 
Suppose that an investor, who was not provided the opportunity to ask 
questions about an investment, executes a contract that indicates that she 
was provided with the opportunity to do so.  Should the written contract be 
permitted to indicate a different context than that which actually existed?  
Presumably, consent theorists would answer “yes” to that question, as one 
of the purposes of contract law is to voluntarily modify or transfer your 
property rights.
49
  If the investor desired to contract away her property right 
 
the factual bargain,” albeit “unfettered by ‘technical’ constraints of classical contract law.”  
JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 19 (4th ed. 2001). 
 49.  Barnett, supra note 48, at 297 (“[C]ontract law concerns enforceable obligations 
arising from the valid transfer of entitlements that are already vested in someone, and this 
difference is what makes consent a moral prerequisite to contractual obligation.”).  But see 
G. Richard Shell, Fair Play, Consent and Securities Arbitration: A Comment on Speidel, 62 
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to assert later that she was not provided the opportunity to ask questions, 
then she may do so by providing her consent to the agreement that does so.  
This argument, however, is most compelling only when one assumes that 
situational influences and context largely do not matter when one executes 
a contract.  Under this view, if consent was evidenced in the written 
contract, then consent was given, and the written contract, with its evidence 
of material terms, as well as evidence of context, is paramount.  The 
importance of the consent to the contract, however, is based on an 
assumption about the context in which it is given.  It is somewhat illogical 
to rely on consent as the significant legal act but ignore the contexts that 
influence (or do not influence) whether consent should be regarded as 
significant.
50
  If additional signature blocks do not indicate or influence any 
change in contracting behavior, then their contextual relevance to consent 
should be resisted or at least viewed as incomplete.
51
 
B. Prototype Theory:  Written Contract as Telling the “Right Story” 
The other way in which prototype theory is implicated is based upon 
the more powerful contracting party’s knowledge that adjudicators will 
often aggregate information into a “story” or narrative.
52
  Adjudicators in a 
 
BROOK. L. REV. 1365, 1371-72 (1996) (suggesting that “tacit consent” may fail to provide 
legitimacy of a particular legal system when too much “autonomy to private ordering” is 
conceded without proper oversight). 
 50.  Warkentine, supra note 8, at 500 (noting that Barnett’s belief that consent to 
unknown terms constitutes in some sense a valid assumption of risk is undermined by the 
fact that, under “the doctrine of assumption of the risk, an adhering party should not be 
bound to a contract term unless the party both knows of the existence of the particular 
contract provisions and appreciates their meaning.”); see also Jean Braucher, Contract 
Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 
697, 703–06 (1990) (criticizing Barnett’s consent theory for viewing consent interpretation 
as a straightforward and simple matter). 
 51.  See, e.g., Carroll v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 636 F. Supp. 2d 41, 55 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(finding a question of fact to exist as to whether the parties intended to be bound by a 
contract where the party had signed only the first page of the contract, despite the presence 
of initials or signature lines on each of the four pages); IFC Credit Corp. v. Rieker Shoe 
Corp., 881 N.E.2d 382, 395 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (finding a forum selection clause to be 
enforceable because above the signature line in the contract was a clause alerting the signer 
that all terms and conditions of the agreement would be binding); Appliance Sales & Serv., 
Inc. v. Command Elecs. Corp., 443 S.E.2d 784, 790 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (finding a forum 
selection clause to be unenforceable where the clause was not highlighted and no signatures 
or initialing were nearby the clause); Dimaggio v. Labreque, No. CV000438800S, 2003 WL 
22480968, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2003) (finding voluntary consent to a contract 
where a party “placed her initials after each of the paragraphs and signed her full signature 
before a witness on the last page”). 
 52.  Feigenson, supra note 3, at 97. 
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contract case are often asked to evaluate an act or series of acts, such as 
whether the contracting party acted in such a way to form a contract or 
whether one party acted in such a way to breach the contract.  If the 
cognitive schema employed in such situations is a story or narrative about 
how such events occur or what they typically look like, then we should 
consider whether such schema could be influenced by the written contract 
itself.
53
  If so, then regardless of whether adjudicators refer to a “narrative” 
(the contract story) or a known structure (the prototypical written contract), 
adjudicators may be influenced merely by the language employed by the 
contracting parties that may not in fact reflect the contracting situation.
54
 
One way to construct the written contract so that it presents a 
particular story with respect to the contracting context is to include 
narrative recitals.  Recitals are often used in preamble format to “set the 
stage” for, and state the purpose of, the contract without necessarily setting 
forth the material terms of the contract.
55
  For example, in a forbearance 
agreement, recitals may indicate that the borrower has defaulted on 
numerous material obligations and that the lender is not obligated to extend 
additional time for performance or cure of the breaches.
56
  Many of the 
facts in the recitals, however, may be stated in more precise legal terms or 
legalese within the more substantive provisions of the agreement itself.  
These recitals may not set forth the material terms of the forbearance 
agreement for the benefit, agreement, and understanding of the borrower 
and lender, but may instead be intended to provide a powerful story-telling 
device for the reference and understanding of the adjudicator.  In the 
 
 53.  Id. at 96 (arguing that, because negligence cases ask juries to consider a particular 
event or associated events, “[w]e might, therefore, expect them to employ prototypes in the 
form of scenarios or stories.”  Feigenson also cites “considerable psychological research 
[that] indicates that jurors typically organize complex evidence into narrative form . . . .”).  
Id. 
 54.  In another context, it has been suggested that “the best way to maximize the 
likelihood of judicial enforcement of gay couples’ cohabitation contracts is to expressly 
formulate them as business agreements, omitting any mention of the parties’ relationship.”  
Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, but Not 
Hell Either, 73 DEN. U. L. REV. 1107, 1138–39 (1996).  Thus, a cohabitation agreement may 
need to tell the “right” story or portray an “ordinary” business relationship to secure 
enforcement by the adjudicator ex post.  I am grateful to Deborah Zalesne for her guidance 
and suggestions regarding the literature covering these types of agreements. 
 55.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining recital as “[a] preliminary 
statement in a contract or deed explaining the reasons for entering into it or the background 
of the transaction, or showing the existence of particular facts”). 
 56.  See, e.g., 10 Westlaw Legal Forms, Debtor and Creditor Relations § 11:23 (Rev. 2d 
ed.) (model forbearance agreement with recitals); § 25:1 Introduction, PLIREF-COMLOAN 
§ 25:1 (describing the draftsman’s objective to “position the lender to exercise its remedies 
in an efficient, summary manner, if the situation deteriorates”). 
0902A029-09F4-4C70-82AE-4726AC95FB07ZACKS_CONTRACTING BLAME_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  3:14 PM 
188 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:1 
 
context of a lawsuit regarding borrowing arrangements and agreements, the 
recitals describing the lender’s favorable demeanor and generosity towards 
the borrower (e.g., with respect to not exercising all rights and remedies 
available to the lender under the existing credit agreement) would make the 
terms of the forbearance agreement seem that much more reasonable as 
well as portray the lender in a more favorable light. 
Significantly, though, the recitals may not tell an accurate or complete 
“story” (e.g., that of the generous lender agreeing to forbear).  For example, 
agreeing to forbear may be routine business practice for lenders reluctant to 
force a debtor company into bankruptcy, where the lender’s likely recovery 
is less than under a scenario where accommodations are provided.
57
  In 
addition, borrowers may not be, in some sense, making a “real” choice 
when agreeing to the forbearance agreement.  The alternative may be filing 
for bankruptcy, which may be unpalatable to the company and its 
employee-managers.  The “choices” in the forbearance agreement are being 
made in a much broader context that, if known and understood, may be 
deemed relevant or important by the adjudicator; instead, the written 
agreement may provide the initial (and only) story of the forbearance.  This 
story or narrative leads to judgments based on how “acceptable” a story can 
be generated from the information provided about a given situation.
58
 
The written contract as part of the story-telling process is particularly 
important in light of the anchoring effect the existence of a contract may 
have.
59
  Even if we could imagine an ex post adjudication where the entire 
contracting context were examined and considered, the presentation (and 
existence) of the written contract often serves as the “anchor” or initial 
story from which all deviations are made.
60
  Adjudicators would likely 
 
 57.  § 25:1 Introduction, PLIREF-COMLOAN § 25:1 (explaining that “the goal is 
obviously to get the loans paid, but at this point in the relationship the borrower’s position is 
‘You can call my loan but it won’t come.’”); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s 
Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1933 (1994) (discussing the reasons certain creditors may 
prefer forbearance to forcing a debtor into bankruptcy); 1 Problem Loan Workouts § 3:3 
(2012) (Westlaw) (explaining how forbearance agreements “allow for a period of both 
continued operation by the borrower and negotiations between the parties” while relieving 
“the parties of the anxiety and urgency which surround the initial stages of any problem 
loan”). 
 58.  Feigenson, supra note 3, at 96 (citing evidence that juries’ “judgments and the 
confidence with which they hold them depend on the ease with which they can generate 
acceptable stories from the data.”) (citation omitted). 
 59.  PLOUS, supra note 17, at 151 (“People adjust insufficiently from anchor values, 
regardless of whether the judgment concerns the chances of nuclear war, the value of a 
house, or any number of other topics.”).  Plous suggests that “it may be worth considering 
multiple anchors before attempting to make a final estimate” or decision.  Id. at 152. 
 60.  In any event, it may serve to reinforce the anchoring belief that the victim is 
responsible for the poor outcome.  See id.  Once an impression is made, an adjudicator is 
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resist any proposed deviations, particularly if the adjudicators have 
confidence in their initial judgment regarding the contract, which, in a 
circular fashion, can be influenced by the presentation and content of the 
written contract.
61
  The importance of narrative arguments within written 
contracts, however, should not necessarily be overstated.  If the elements of 
the contracting context are irrelevant or deemed relatively unimportant for 
ex post contractual adjudication, then such “stories” may not be employed 
as frequently.  For example, we might expect fewer recitals in routine 
purchase orders issued and accepted by sophisticated commercial parties 
because the contracting context may be relatively irrelevant; that is, it may 
be extremely difficult to demonstrate procedural unconscionability or other 
contextual problems when such parties are involved.  The sophistication of 
the parties and absence of situational contracting pressure may thus reduce 
the likelihood of employment of such narrative tools, at least for purposes 
of contextual presentation.
62
 
C. Causal Attribution:  Written Contract as Counterfactual Indicator 
Counterfactual analysis is another primary mode of analysis 
causation.
63
  Utilizing the simulation heuristic, a type of this analysis, 
 
likely to search out and identify only that evidence that supports his or her conclusion.  Reid 
Hastie & Robyn M. Dawes, Rational Choice in an Uncertain World: The Psychology of 
Judgment and Decision Making 32-33 (2001) (noting that a “decision maker’s thoughts are 
dominated by his or her initial impression, a phenomenon referred to as primacy effect or 
confirmatory hypothesis testing.”) (citation omitted); see also Prentice, supra note 4, at 365 
n.143 (defining cognitive dissonance). 
 61.  Feigenson, supra note 3, at 97 (noting that “audiences find stories that vary from 
their expectations, that leave gaps or contradict their ‘stock scripts’ or prototypes, to be 
dubious”).  Note that, at trial, the next step after having constructed the initial presentation is 
to account within the “story” for the behavior that is being contested in the lawsuit.  See id. 
at 98 (describing how, at least with respect to accident trials, the story presented must 
explain the deviation from the prototype).  This step is not addressed in this Article because 
the prototype theory and its use in written contract is being examined solely for purposes of 
determining the extent to which perceptions of the contracting context can be influenced ex 
ante by the written contract.  In other words, one should consider how important a starting 
point the written contract is for the story constructed by an adjudicator.  The fact that 
attorneys would then have to add to the written contract’s story to explain the “deviant” 
behavior by one of the contracting parties is interesting but not relevant in this context. 
 62.  Another explanation, of course, is that sophisticated parties may resist another’s 
attempt to employ such self-serving devices. 
 63.  SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION, 432 (2d ed. 1991) 
(explaining “norm theory” in terms of how people make decisions based on the emotions 
evoked by a particular outcome:  “An abnormal event is one that has easily imagined 
alternative outcomes . . . the more easily imagined the counterfactual scenario, the more 
intense the emotion one experiences.”); Feigenson, supra note 3, at 116; Robert N. 
Strassfeld, If. . .: Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO WASH. L. REV. 339, 345 (1992) 
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individuals may imagine alternative situations in which the outcome at 
issue did not result.
64
  By identifying the alternative situations in which the 
negative outcome did not arise and comparing the similarities with, and 
differences from, the current situation, individuals assess what must have 
caused the current situation.
65
 
In the contract situation, adjudicators are not always asked to 
determine the legal cause of a particular event.  Often, the dispute concerns 
whether particular acts or omissions constituted a breach under the 
contract.  With respect to examination of the contract context, however, the 
written contract can provide evidence of the “normal” state of affairs, a 
world where contracts do not exist absent the satisfaction of specific 
requirements.
66
  In addition, when imagining scenarios, adjudicators 
typically try to determine the unusual act that (accordingly) led to the 
unusual situation (the existence of the contract).
67
  Consequently, the 
adjudicator may be more likely to determine that the “deviant” act is the 
execution of the contract.
68
 
Written contracts often evidence an awareness of counterfactual 
analysis.  For example, a written contract may contain a provision, often in 
boldface near the signature block, that the signing party had an opportunity 
to review the contract with counsel.  Based in part on the presence of such 
a provision, often an adjudicator may consequently determine that the 
signature was the act most easily avoided if the contracting party did not 
want to be bound by the terms of the contract.  The “normal” state of 
affairs is thus a world of “no contracts,” but the contracting party freely 
 
(“Counterfactual considerations intrude at many stages in legal factfinding and 
decisionmaking.  Sometimes we acknowledge their presence, but other times we remain 
unaware of them.  Sometimes counterfactuals help focus our inquiry, but other times they 
lead us astray.  Nevertheless, whether express or implicit, helpful or misleading, they are 
there.”). 
 64.  Feigenson, supra note 3, at 116; Hastie & Dawes, supra note 60, at 127. 
 65.  Feigenson, supra note 3, at 116-17 (noting that “the more readily they [people who 
must identify the cause of a particular event] can construct an alternative scenario . . . the 
more probable they judge that alternative, and the more likely they are to think that . . . the 
actual event is the prior occurrence that is changed in the alternative story”). 
 66.  Obviously, what is required to form a contract has evolved over time and still is 
debated.  See Murray, supra note 48, at 222 (“Something more than mutual assent, as 
manifested in offer and acceptance, has always been necessary to create an informal 
contract, i.e., the typical contract involving a bargain.”); Barnett, supra note 48, at 297-98 
(“Freedom of action and interaction would be seriously impeded, and possibly destroyed, if 
legitimate rights holders who have not acted in a tortious manner could be deprived of their 
rights by force of law without their consent.”). 
 67.  Feigenson, supra note 3, at 118. 
 68.  Id. (noting that “the cause of an accident is likely to be perceived to be the act (or 
omission) that a protagonist could easily have chosen to do otherwise”). 
ZACKS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  3:14 PM 
2012] CONTRACTING BLAME 191 
 
chose, after an opportunity to consult with counsel, to execute the contract.  
We should, though, question the “accuracy” of such a provision, 
particularly if there are other contextual clues relevant to the contracting 
situation.  For example, when an employee is being asked to execute an 
employment agreement as a condition to employment, there are situational 
pressures present that may call into question any conclusion an adjudicator 
may make about the voluntariness of the employee’s consent based on the 
presence of an “attorney consultation” provision or similar provision. 
Similarly, multiple signature blocks (or places where a contracting 
party signs his or her initials) may be included to encourage a particular 
form of counterfactual analysis rather than inducing the contracting party to 
actually read or signify agreement to a particular provision.  Under 
counterfactual analysis, the events or acts most easily changeable are the 
contracting party’s multiple executions of the agreement.  Accordingly, if 
the contracting party did not want to be bound by the agreement, there were 
multiple “stops” along the way where the contracting party could have 
walked away from the agreement.
69
 
A related example is the so-called “click-through” agreement, where 
an Internet user agrees to a license or other agreement by “clicking” his or 
her agreement.  Decisions regarding such cases indicate that adjudicators 
place importance on the particular act of “clicking,” even though the step 
may not indicate any “more” or “greater” agreement with the terms of the 
license agreement than if the license agreement had been merely posted on 
the pages from where the software or other computer product was going to 
be downloaded or used.
70
  Using the simulation heuristic, adjudicators 
 
 69.  Id. at 118–19 (suggesting that, in the accident situation, “the more readily jurors 
can imagine a person acting differently and thus avoiding the accident, the more likely they 
are to find that the person’s conduct caused the accident, and that the person is at fault for 
not having acted otherwise”). 
 70.  See, e.g., A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC., 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 480 (E.D. Va. 2008) 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 
630 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The Court finds that the parties entered into a valid contractual 
agreement when Plaintiffs clicked ‘I Agree’ to acknowledge their acceptance of the terms of 
the Clickwrap Agreement.”); Mortgage Plus, Inc. v. DocMagic, Inc., No. 03-2582-GTV-
DJW, 2004 WL 2331918, *5 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 2004) (“[I]t is undisputed between the 
parties in this case that Mortgage Plus had to affirmatively click the ‘Yes’ button in 
assenting to the Software Licensing Agreement as a prerequisite to installing the DocMagic 
software. . . . Plaintiff had a choice as to whether to download the software and utilize the 
related services; thus, under the specific facts presented here, installation and use of the 
software with the attached license constituted an affirmative acceptance of the license terms 
by Mortgage Plus and the licensing agreement became effective upon this affirmative 
assent.  The Court finds the clickwrap agreement here is a valid contract.”); Martin v. 
Snapple Beverage Corp., 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5938, *15 (2005) (reasoning that 
based on the internet user clicking “I agree” with respect to twelve boldface hyperlink 
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determine that the “deviant” act is the “click” of agreement, even though 
the click is likely irrelevant to the contracting party, who may not 
distinguish between those products where a “click” is required and one 
where it is not.
71
  This provides adjudicators with a “step” to identify more 
easily the “cause” of a party being bound—or not bound—by a contract.
72
  
It is easy to imagine an alternative scenario where you (personally) did not 
click, or at least, it is harder to imagine such an alternative scenario where 
the license agreement is passively disclosed.  Thus, we can more easily 
construct an alternative scenario that leads us to blame the actor if we can 
see that a positive action was taken—the “click.”
73
  Somewhat as a 
 
topics, “it is easily inferred that persons who sought to purchase items through the website 
agreed to (and knew they were agreeing to) the terms of the official rules, and that the 
arbitration provision (a part of those rules) was easily an easily accessible paragraph that 
they could review”); Groff v. Am. Online, Inc., PC 97-0331, 1998 WL 307001, *5 (R.I. 
Super. May 27, 1998) (“Here, plaintiff effectively ‘signed’ the agreement by clicking ‘I 
agree’ not once but twice.  Under these circumstances, he should not be heard to complain 
that he did not see, read, etc. and is bound to the terms of his agreement.”); Moore v. 
Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (“The terms of the EULA 
[End User License Agreement] were prominently displayed on the program user’s computer 
screen before the software could be installed.  Moreover, the program’s user was required to 
indicate assent to the EULA by clicking on the ‘I agree’ icon before proceeding with the 
download of the software.”). Notwithstanding the above decisions’ emphases on such 
actions, “[l]awyers, law students and even law professors are quick to acknowledge that 
they themselves rarely read the forms they sign or the agreements they ‘click through’ on 
the Internet.”  Warkentine, supra note 8, at 515. 
 71.  See, e.g., Martin, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5938 at *16–17 (discussing the 
specific requirement for a “click” in order to find an agreement). 
 72.  Hartzog, supra note 33, at 1644 (describing how “[c]ourts tend to enforce 
clickwrap agreements that require an action on the part of the user, but they tend to shy 
away from enforcing browsewrap agreements that require no outward manifestation of 
assent.”). 
 73.  Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 237 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (concluding 
that “[u]nlike the impermissible agreement in Specht, the user here had to take affirmative 
action and click the ‘Yes, I agree to the above terms and conditions’ button in order to 
proceed to the next step.”); i.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 
328, 338 (D. Mass 2002) (“The only issue before the Court is whether clickwrap license 
agreements are an appropriate way to form contracts, and the Court holds that they are.  In 
short, i.LAN explicitly accepted the clickwrap agreement when it clicked on the box stating 
‘I agree’”).  It is unclear how much more likely this scenario actually is.  It has been shown, 
for example, that very few people read the click-through agreements, which are presumably 
little different from information that was previously passively disclosed.  See Nathaniel S. 
Good et al., Noticing Notice: A Large-Scale Experiment on the Timing of Software License 
Agreements, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING 
SYSTEMS (CHI 2007) (explaining survey results with respects to End User License 
Agreements (EULAs) as follows:  “Only very few users reported reading EULAs often and 
thoroughly when they encounter them (1.4%).  Members of a larger group categorize 
themselves as those who often read parts of the agreement or browse contents (24.8%).  
However, 66.2% admit to rarely reading or browsing the contents of EULAs, and 7.7% 
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corollary, we can imagine that if the software license agreement were 
passively disclosed on the Internet without a click-through agreement, we 
would be more inclined to point to the deviant act (or omission) as the 
passive disclosure, which would lead us to blame the licensor.
74
 
D. Hindsight Bias:  Written Contract as Predictability Indicator 
Another behavioral bias that may be exploited through written 
contract is the hindsight bias, which is the tendency to judge that a 
particular event had a higher probability of occurring because one had the 
knowledge that the event did, in fact, occur.
75
  We are likely to see 
something as a more probable, predictable, and foreseeable result once we 
know that the result has, in fact, occurred.
76
  Thus, in litigated disputes, we 
may believe that an adverse outcome should have been better anticipated 
by the parties involved. 
 
indicated that they have not noticed these agreements in the past or have never read them.”). 
 74.  Indeed, several cases support this conclusion.  See Netbula, LLC v. Blindview Dev. 
Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that a license agreement was 
not formed because the software could be installed and used without reading or clicking on 
the license agreement’s terms and conditions); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. 
Supp. 2d 585, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that the mere act of downloading software did 
not indicate assent to a license agreement). 
 75.  Samuel Issacharoff, The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, 
Behavioral Economics, and the Law: Can there be a Behavioral Law & Economics?, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1738 (1998) (describing the “the common tendency to assume the 
inevitability of those events that have actually transpired, regardless of the actual ex ante 
probability of their occurring in the future.”); Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex 
Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 90 (1995) 
(“When trying to reconstruct what a foresightful state of mind would have perceived, people 
remain anchored in the hindsightful perspective.  This leaves the reported outcome looking 
much more likely than it would look to the reasonable person without the benefit of 
hindsight.”) (citation omitted). 
 76.  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 
U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 576 (1998) (“Research by cognitive psychologists has shown that the 
folk wisdom on hindsight is correct—past events seem more predictable than they really 
were.”) (citation omitted).  There is a similar effect, the “outcome bias,” which is the 
“tendency to base assessments of a decision’s quality on its consequences.”  Id. at 581; Reid 
Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s Performance as a Risk 
Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 911 (1998) (noting that people appear to confuse the 
difference between probabilities and consequences, the former being the “likelihood [the 
event] will occur; the payoff refers to the magnitude of the consequences”).  Hastie and 
Viscusi note, for example, that “large losses can affect the perceptions of the preventability 
of an accident,” even though the amount of losses does not suggest a high probability of the 
accident or that the accident could easily have been prevented.  Id. at 911; see also Kamin & 
Rachlinski, supra note 75, at 90 (noting that “people overestimate both the probability of the 
known outcome and the ability of decision makers to foresee the outcome”). 
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With respect to written contracts, we may expect provisions to 
reinforce this bias with respect to the contracting context.  For example, a 
contract may include a provision that suggests the foreseeability of 
particular risks of using the contracted service (e.g., “The [buyer] agrees 
and acknowledges that the use of the service is hazardous and may result in 
the loss of life or property”).  If the service does result in the loss of life or 
property, adjudicators are likely to (i) even in the absence of a contract, 
determine that the loss of life or property was more predictable than it was, 
simply because of the hindsight bias and (ii) conclude even more strongly 
that the buyer (the party that did not prepare the contract) should have 
anticipated such a result.  If adjudicators consistently peer through the 
distorted lens of hindsight, the written contract can indicate upon which 
actor they should be focusing.  Such disclosures, however, have been seen 
to be largely ineffective in communicating such risks and alleviating an 
individual’s optimism bias with respect to future risks.
77
  Contracting 
parties who do not prepare the contract face biases at both extreme points 
of the contracting continuum:  They are likely ex ante to underestimate the 
probability of negative outcomes when entering into risks, while the 
adjudicators are likely ex post to overestimate such contracting parties’ 
ability to do so.
78
  This is particularly accentuated by our self-serving belief 
in hindsight to believe that we personally would have acted differently in 
the same situation.
79
 
In a somewhat different scenario, the prospective investor typically is 
provided with a prospectus that is intended to disclose all material risks 
 
 77.  See, e.g., Zacks, supra note 36, at 1481 (noting that “the context of credit card 
disclosures and standard form contracts, however, suggests that disclosure alone does not 
result in better comprehension”); Prentice, supra note 4, at 374 (“Marketing scholars have 
demonstrated how difficult it is to correct invalid inferences derived from advertising 
through even concurrent disclosures.  Similarly, sellers’ oral representations about great 
returns, investment safety, and the like can easily anchor investors’ expectations and then 
the natural human tendency to adjust insufficiently to new information will prevent the 
printed warnings in the subsequently signed written contract from sufficiently correcting the 
investors’ judgment.”) (citation omitted); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A 
Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (2000) (“While there is an obvious 
information asymmetry between issuers and investors, ‘[o]ne must be careful to avoid the 
fallacy that if some information is good, more must be better.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 299 (1991)). 
 78.  Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 75, at 101 (suggesting that, as a result of the 
hindsight bias, “any untaken precaution,” at least in the tort context, “may later give rise to 
liability, even if that precaution could not reasonably have been justified ex ante.”). 
 79.  Norman G. Poythress et al., Reframing the Medical Malpractice Tort Reform 
Debate: Social Science Research Implications for Non-Economic Reforms, 16 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 65, 99–100 (1992) (describing experimental demonstrations of such an 
effect).  See infra Section II.E. 
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involved with a particular investment.  Investors, however, are unlikely to 
read or assess properly such risks even in the presence of clear and 
conspicuous disclosure.
80
  Such disclosure may nevertheless be cited ex 
post as additional proof that the risk was foreseeable, predictable, and 
known, and thus “[t]he [hindsight] bias converts the negligence standard 
into a quasi-strict liability rule.”
81
  Even when statutes or regulations 
require such detailed disclosure, such a system is not necessarily effective 
in creating the “credible commitment” of disclosure necessary for investors 
to pay more for securities.
82
 
Other areas of the law have recognized the dangers of the hindsight 
bias.  Corporate law, for example, includes the business judgment rule, 
which precludes substantive review of a board of directors’ decision 
provided that certain procedural safeguards were followed when the 
decision was made.
83
  This rule may be a safeguard against the hindsight 
bias, in this case “the concern that even a good decision can produce an 
undesirable result and can be judged unfairly in hindsight.”
84
  Similarly, 
federal securities fraud claims may require evidence of specific intent to 
defraud, thus blunting the otherwise significant impact of a poor investment 
outcome upon the adjudicator attempting to assert seller liability.
85
  In the 
 
 80.  Langevoort, supra note 30, at 682–83 (explaining “quite clearly why investors 
rarely read [or read carefully]” investment documents, such as the time-saving benefit 
investors receive from relying on a broker’s recommendation and avoiding the costs 
involved in personally assessing a possible investment).  Langevoort nevertheless suggests 
improved risk disclosure as the solution for investment agreements involving sophisticated 
investors.  See generally id. at 688–95. 
 81.  Rachlinski, supra note 76, at 622; see Langevoort, supra note 30, at 682 
(describing an ex post characterization of a failure to read a prospectus as “reckless” as 
being “troublesome on a number of levels,” in particular because such behavior is “quite 
normal and expected.”).  Langevoort notes that “[s]ome judges may simply underestimate 
the regularity with which investors do not read, and thus treat those whose claims are 
litigated as aberrant.”  Id. at 684. 
 82.  Bainbridge, supra note 77, at 1033–34 (suggesting that such a “bond” would be 
better created through antifraud rules with expanded duties to disclose rather than 
mandatory specified disclosures). 
 83.  JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW 199 (3d ed. 
2011) (“In general, courts will not undertake to review the expediency of contracts or other 
business transactions authorized by the directors . . . .  According to the better view, the 
business judgment rule presupposes that reasonable diligence and care have been 
exercised.”); Issacharoff, supra note 75, at 1738 (explaining that the “business judgment 
rule in the law of corporate governance can be read as a means for lending caution against 
post facto assessments of liability of corporate directors and managers that might result from 
juries reviewing failed business investments after the fact”). 
 84.  Rachlinski, supra note 76, at 621. 
 85.  Id. at 616–17 (noting that the “heightened pleading requirement means that a 
plaintiff must do more than merely allege that some prediction made by the defendant 
ultimately failed to come true” because “[t]here is no ‘fraud by hindsight.’”  Id. (citing 
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tort context, courts often suppress evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures taken by a defendant to avoid the impression—often incorrect— 
that the defendant must have been negligent if subsequent remedial 
measures are taken.
86
 
Instead of a safeguard, however, contract law presumes the 
foreseeability of risks in contracting contexts with respect to an executed 
contract and, as suggested by this Article, permits the artificial 
reinforcement of such foreseeability through different provisions of the 
written contract itself.  The parol evidence rule, for example, excludes 
extrinsic evidence that contradicts or supplements written terms in an 
integrated written contract.
87
  If the written term provides that a particular 
contractual context existed (e.g., that an attorney was consulted), then the 
rule would potentially exclude extrinsic evidence that the context did not in 
fact exist.
88
 
The parol evidence rule in some sense may be seen as reinforcing the 
hindsight bias because it may prevent us from reviewing ex post all of the 
evidence relevant to the contracting context.  As a result, if a contract 
indicates that a particular risk is disclosed as a material risk, then the 
adjudicator’s focus may be confined to that conclusion, reinforcing the 
adjudicator’s preexisting hindsight bias that the loss was foreseeable to the 
“buyer.”  The parol evidence rule resists the introduction of evidence that 
may contradict a particular contractual outcome to the extent it is addressed 
in the written contract.  Moreover, to the extent that a contract includes a 
merger clause (often under the direction of the contract preparer), which 
typically provides that the written contract is the complete and exhaustive 
agreement of the parties, the judge may exclude evidence of other 
understandings between the parties.
89
  Although potentially desirable in 
certain highly sophisticated commercial contexts, it is less so where 
 
DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
 86.  Rachlinski, supra note 76, at 617–18 (arguing that, from a relevance perspective, a 
“rational factfinder” would not find subsequent remedial measures to be probative of 
negligence, but we nevertheless find evidence of such measures to be excludable to avoid an 
overreaction by juries).  If juries do “overreact” to such measures and find defendants to be 
more likely to be liable, then courts are concerned that defendants will be deterred from 
engaging in such productive activities.  Id. 
 87.  FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, § 7.2. 
 88.  Lawrence M. Solan, The Written Contract as Safe Harbor for Dishonest Conduct, 
77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 87 (2001) (“The law of contracts gives special status to the 
written word.  The statute of frauds requires some contracts to be in writing.  The parol 
evidence rule excludes extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous understandings of an 
agreement when a document purports to encompass their entire understanding.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 89.  Warkentine, supra note 8, at 478. 
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certainty and reliability of the written terms of the contract do not 
necessarily reflect both parties’ knowing and negotiated desires, such as in 
the case of a repeat commercial player and the end user consumer.
90
  For 
example, if a particular contractual risk is disclosed and the event or loss 
warned of occurs, adjudicators are likely to be influenced by the 
predictability of the event or loss.  The contractual provision thus heightens 
the preexisting hindsight bias without regard to the actual predictability of 
the event or loss ex ante. 
E. Defensive Attribution:  Reinforcing Justice Through Written 
Contract 
Some of the examples discussed above demonstrate how written 
contracts reinforce the adjudicators’ fundamental attribution error.  By 
making the actor (in this instance, the contracting party that did not prepare 
the contract) the most salient actor, whether through the inclusion of 
multiple signature blocks or a “click-through” agreement, we tend to see 
such parties as the more likely “causal agents.”
91
  By including such 
provisions, a contract preparer can create a situation where adjudicators 
believe that others, including the adjudicators, could and would have acted 
differently if presented with the same contract.
92
 
This could be based upon the contract preparer’s understanding of 
defensive attribution, which is the tendency to blame the victim because of 
a desire to avoid believing that the bad outcome could have happened to 
them.
93
  For example, in the securities law context, when lawsuits alleging 
 
 90.  See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 76, at 591–93 (noting the effect of the hindsight 
bias on ex post judgments under objective standards, subjective standards and foreseeability 
standards); Warkentine, supra note 8, at 538 (describing the effect of merger clauses in the 
standardized form context, and in particular, the “typical approach to treating a merger 
clause as a statement of the intent of the parties without exploring whether there was actual 
knowing assent to that particular contract term”). 
 91.  Feigenson, supra note 3, at 128. 
 92.  Id. at 129; Prentice, supra note 4, at 404.  This is not to say, of course, that the 
adjudicators’ beliefs would be incorrect.  See, e.g, Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation 
and the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1327, 1353 (2011) (arguing that requiring “that 
the consumer click for each benefit or right granted by the consumer to the website, rather 
than once to indicate agreement to all benefits or rights contained in the agreement, creates a 
more accurate bargain that may actually reflect the intent of the parties.”) (emphasis added). 
 93.  Jerry M. Burger, Motivational Biases in the Attribution of Responsibility for an 
Accident: A Meta-Analysis of the Defensive-Attribution Hypothesis, 90 PSYCHOL. BULL. 496, 
497 (1981) (“[T]he awareness of a severe accident generates for the individual a need to 
believe that the unfortunate event was controllable and may therefore be averted in the 
future.”); Prentice, supra note 4, at 404 (noting that “jurors [like everyone else] wish to 
believe that they would not be victimized as plaintiffs have been”). 
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seller fraud are brought in connection with an investment that has not gone 
well, juries may tend to blame the buyers because juries believe or want to 
believe that they would not have fallen victim to the same fraud.
94
  We do 
not want to believe that we, going forward, are subject to the same risks 
and may suffer the same fate, so it is more comforting to attribute the cause 
of the outcome to the victim and the victim’s disposition.
95
  Similarly, our 
desire to believe in a world where outcomes are just and people are 
rewarded and punished based on their goodness suggests that we will 
naturally blame the victim.
96
  In the contract context, adjudicators may 
desire to believe that they would not have consented to the contract as 
presented or would have acted otherwise in the contracting context—and it 
would not have happened if the victim were a good person—and 
consequently, the “victim” must be a careless person who should be held 
accountable.
97
 
 
 94.  Prentice, supra note 4, at 407 (“[P]utting all this together, it is likely that juries will 
be looking for human causes for investment losses; they may underestimate situational 
causes.  Their initial tendency to blame the victim means that human nature places the 
burden of proof on plaintiffs, just as the law does.”).  Rachlinski also describes how a belief 
in a “just world” results in a heightened perception of the foreseeability of an event, thus 
justifying blaming the victim.  Rachlinski, supra note 76, at 582–83.  We may be subject to 
the hindsight bias because of our desire to believe we are more knowledgeable than we 
actually are (“impression management”) by asserting we could have predicted the outcome 
of a particular series of events or acts.  Id. at 582–84. 
 95.  In the accident context, “[i]f we can categorize a serious accident as in some way 
the victim’s fault, it is reassuring.  We then simply need to assure ourselves that we are a 
different kind of person from the victim, or that we would behave differently under similar 
circumstances, and we feel protected from catastrophe.”  Elaine Walster, Assignment of 
Responsibility for an Accident, 3 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 73, 74 (1966).  Our 
“perceptions about the economic behavior of others can be quite inventive,” while “[m]ost 
people, especially those with high self-esteem, express great confidence that they would not 
have been taken in by puffery and other claims that in hindsight seem based more on hope 
than experience.”  Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that “Bespeak Caution,” 49 BUS. 
LAW. 481, 493 (1994). 
 96.  Prentice, supra note 4, at 405–06. 
 97.  Feigenson, supra note 3, at 136–137 (noting that, when assessing blame when a 
plaintiff has claimed to be harmed, “jurors may need to protect a belief that bad things only 
happen to ‘bad’ people, obviously a case of fundamental attribution error”).  This may be 
particularly true when adjudicators or observers can imagine themselves in a similar 
situation.  Burger, supra note 93, at 498 (noting that “situationally similar observers will 
then be motivated to deny personal similarity to the perpetrator.”).  Note, however, that 
some have claimed that observers may be more inclined to perceive situational influences in 
such situations.  Fiona Lee & Mark Hallahan, Do Situational Expectations Produce 
Situational Inferences? The Role of Future Expectations in Directing Inferential Goals, 80 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 545, 554 (2001) (“[T]he overwhelming evidence of 
dispositional primacy in the literature may not necessarily reflect how people make 
inferences in their normal, everyday lives in which the situations encountered tend to be 
meaningful and recurring.”). 
ZACKS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  3:14 PM 
2012] CONTRACTING BLAME 199 
 
As seen above, adjudicators are susceptible to utilizing defensive 
attribution in their attempt to diminish the possibility in their minds that 
such an unfavorable situation could have happened to them.
98
  Thus, by 
presenting a written contract that indicates voluntariness and other 
favorable contextual clues for contract enforcement (regardless of their 
truth), contract preparers can encourage the commission of attribution 
errors.
99
 
The movement towards “plain English” may be an example of this.  
Plain English promoters suggest that a contract is “superior” if it discloses 
material terms in a more simple, straightforward, and understandable 
manner.
100
  The existence of plain English within a contract may reinforce 
our perception of a voluntary promise, since presumably the contracting 
 
 98.  See supra Section I.B. 
 99.  Langevoort, supra note 95, at 494 (discussing the danger that “judges implicitly 
may invoke the false consensus of a highly personalized ‘How would I have read the 
disclosure,’ and in so doing, apply a standard of investor rationality that does not reflect the 
actual behavior of the population at large.”).  Moreover, these judgments are made with the 
knowledge “that this particular reliance was indeed unwise.  In hindsight, it is easy to find 
fault with reliance on self-interested others.”  Id.  As an interesting sidenote, Langevoort 
explains the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, which prevents investors from recovering for 
fraud if seller projections are accompanied by satisfactory cautionary language, as evolving 
in part from the above-described biases, “wherein a good bit of language exists that 
marginalizes those investors who willingly rely on expressions of optimism. . . . In real life, 
optimism sells.”  Id.  Langevoort cautions against “giving boilerplate cautionary language 
talismanic power, for forecasts and projections can mislead reasonable investors 
notwithstanding their typically self-evident disclaimers.”  Id. at 503.  In the standard form 
contracting context, it has been recognized that the model of a negotiated agreement based 
on mutual assent may not apply, so the “inquiry, therefore, shifts to a question of which 
terms will be deemed part of the contract and which terms will not.”  Warkentine, supra 
note 8, at 479-80.  The limitations of the inquiry are described in Section III. infra. 
 100.  See Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social 
Psychological Analysis of Disclosure Laws and Call for Mortgage Counseling to Prevent 
Predatory Lending, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 85 (2010) (describing increased and 
improved disclosure as being the main tool utilized by the federal government to protect 
consumers from predatory lending); Kenneth B. Firtel, Note, Plain English: A Reappraisal 
of the Intended Audience of Disclosure Under the Securities Act of 1933, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 
851, 871, 872 (1999) (“According to the SEC, one of the disclosure’s key deficiencies is 
that issuers fail to make the prospectus readable and understandable to the general investing 
public.  This problem stems from two sources:  (1) the issuers’ efforts to obscure rather than 
explain certain key topics in the prospectus; and (2) the length and complexity of the 
documents. . . . But, according to the SEC, if they could somehow compel clear writing, all 
investors could understand the information.”) (citation omitted).  Although unexamined 
here, it would be interesting to assess whether the deference that a form contract induces on 
the part of the contracting party that did not prepare the contract (because it appears “legal”) 
also has a similar effect on adjudicators.  See Prentice, supra note 4, at 372; Shell, supra 
note 49, at 1368–69 (“It is apparent to anyone looking at the printed form that someone in 
the legal department has given it a lot of thought . . . .”). 
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party must have understood (or should have understood) the contract.
101
  
The voluntariness of the promise in turn has significant moral implications 
for the adjudicator.
102
  To the extent that terms are construed as promises or 
commitments, we are more likely to believe that they should be enforced as 
presented.
103
  Thus, “lay intuitions are still relevant in how people interpret 
 
 101.  Many such cases have evolved from the common law “duty to read” a contract. 
See, e.g., E.H. Ashley & Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Serv., 907 F.2d 1274, 1279 (1st Cir. 
1990) (noting that the relevant clause “was set forth in the most conspicuous print on the 
first page of the contract.  The contract was written in plain English”); Tranchant v. Ritz 
Carlton Hotel Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35099, *15–16 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2011) (noting 
that “[t]he record also suggests that plaintiff was fully capable of reading and understanding 
the terms of the agreement . . . as it was written entirely in simple, plain English, as opposed 
to ‘legalese’”); Bunge Corp. v. Marion Williams, 359 N.E.2d 844, 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) 
(noting that, under Illinois law “[a] person is presumed to know those things which 
reasonable diligence on his part would bring to his attention,” and finding sufficient 
direction within the contract to note the existence of the arbitration provision (citing Vargas 
v. Esquire, 166 F.2d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 1948)); Denlinger, Inc. v. Dendler, 608 A.2d 1061, 
1070 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (noting that, under Pennsylvania law, one may not complain that 
he or she did not know what was contained in the executed contract, and that in the case at 
hand, the terms were provided in “clear and distinct type,” in plain English, and “[t]he term 
‘Applicant’ is always capitalized, which draws attention to it”). 
 102.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, introductory note 
(1981) (noting “the sanctity of contract and the resulting moral obligation to honor one’s 
promises”); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 40 (1981) (observing that contracts are “grounded in the primitive moral 
institution of promising”); T.M. SCANLON, Promises and Contracts, in THE THEORY OF 
CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 86 (Peter Benson, ed., 2001) (“The law of contracts is clearly 
a social institution, backed by the coercive power of the state and subject to modification 
through judicial decisions and legislative enactments. Promising is also often seen as a 
social institution of a more informal kind, defined by certain rules that are not enacted but 
rather backed by moral argument and enforced through the informal sanction of moral 
disapproval.  Many have argued that the wrong involved in breaking a promise depends 
essentially on the existence of a social practice of this kind.”); Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, 
supra note 21, at 409–10 (discussing the moral intuitions associated with contracts); 
Andrew Galbraith & Jason Dean, In China, Some Firms Defy Business Norms, WALL ST. J. 
ONLINE, Sep. 6, 2011,  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903895904576 
546381512015722.html (describing how, in some cultures, contracts lack the moral element 
that exists within U.S. business culture).  But see Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract 
Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439, 439–40 (2006) (describing, but disagreeing with, the 
proposition that all breaches of contractual promises should be disapproved of morally); 
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 
720 (2007) (arguing that contract theory diverges from moral components:  “First, contract 
and promise diverge in some significant ways, although not by directly generating 
inconsistent directives.  Second, some of the standard arguments for the doctrines’ 
divergence are exactly the sort of justifications that a virtuous agent could not accept.  
Third, even though some reasons for the divergence may be acceptable to a virtuous agent, 
the divergence itself may risk another difficulty by contributing to a culture that may be in 
tension with the conditions for the maintenance of moral character.”). 
 103.  Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 21, at 410 (“Parties’ beliefs about the 
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its [a contract’s] terms,” and presumably the terms can reinforce those lay 
intuitions.
104
  When presented with a situation where the contracting party 
appears to be acting more outrageously by breaching a “voluntary” 
contract, our moral intuitions about the sacredness of the promise lead us to 
judge the contracting party more harshly.
105
  Presumably, the more plain the 
English is within the contract, the easier it is for us to impute intentionality 
or knowledge to the contracting party suing or being sued for a breach or 
enforcement of the contract. 
The contract preparer often is in the most favorable light, such as in 
recitals of a forbearance agreement where the lender is presented as a 
generous and gracious party.
106
  A clause may also indicate the importance 
of a particular clause (e.g., “The parties agree that [the contract preparer] 
would not have entered into this agreement without [the non-contract 
preparer] agreeing to the following . . .”) and the sincerity of the contract 
preparer in preparing the agreement in a particular manner.  The 
adjudicators presumably are more likely to find that the contracting party 
(the non-preparer) herself is responsible because of her disposition 
(presumably, an irresponsible nature) amid such a contracting context.
107
  
By presenting a particular vision of the contracting “situation,” contract 
preparers deemphasize the contracting context in order to emphasize the 
blameworthiness of the actor.  Accordingly, we are led to conclude that the 
disposition of the actor led to the contract’s execution.  The written contract 
is not only based on this disposition but also reinforces it through its 
provisions themselves.  The blameworthiness of the individual actor is 
 
contract were informed by the terms of the contract itself as well as their intuitions or beliefs 
about contracts in general, namely, that they are enforceable as written.”). 
 104.  Id. at 410. 
 105.  Id. at 406–07 (explaining the results of their experiment where people judged the 
breaching party more harshly based on the motivations, intentions, and timing of the 
breaching party).  Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron also discuss other tort experiments 
demonstrating that individuals imposed punishments “based on the moral rule that the 
punishment should be proportionate to the outrageousness of the act, regardless of whether 
the punishment would be useful, pointless, or even harmful.”  Id. at 411.  They predict that, 
in the contract context, people will be unable to detach the moral aspects of a breach even 
when it may be an “efficient” result.  Id. 
 106.  See supra Section II.B.  In the accident situation, we may expect attorneys to 
construct “suitable personality profiles for the parties.”  Feigenson, supra note 3, at 138.  So, 
too, with contracts, we may expect contracts that demonstrate the reasonableness of the 
contract preparer.  The more reasonable the contract preparer seems, the more likely it is 
that the other contracting party will be perceived as responsible for any contractual act. 
 107.  See supra notes 89–95.  If the contract can answer our desire to believe that 
everyone receives his or her just fate by presenting believable personalities of each of the 
parties, then adjudicators will be more comfortable blaming the “bad” contracting party 
(presumably, the party that did not prepare the contract). 
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highlighted in the contract, which reinforces the blameworthiness and legal 
significance of the actor’s consent to the contract.
108
 
Context manipulation is possible through the use of particular 
formatting features as well.  Ostensibly to warn an investor (to prevent a 
fraud or other securities claim), a subscription agreement typically contains 
disclosures advising of the risk of loss or other restrictions of the particular 
investment.  These disclosures often are presented in an explicit fashion, 
whether through the use of capital letters and boldfaced type or by being set 
aside in separate paragraphs or pages.  Evidence suggests, however, that 
investors routinely ignore these warnings.
109
  The impact on an adjudicator 
can be substantial, however, as the warnings might suggest that the 
contracting party had control and was aware of all contractual provisions.
110
  
The investor, therefore, is more blameworthy and should be held 
accountable under the written contract.  This effect may be particularly 
strong in light of the adjudicator’s tendency to blame the investor in any 
event.
111
 
Similarly, the “relevant” evidence to an adjudicator or legislator with 
respect to a particular contractual term may be its conspicuousness.
112
  
 
 108.  In this particular situation, it is noteworthy that this provision is also a useful 
“counterfactual indicator” to an adjudicator; that is, the fact most easily changed is not 
signing the contract, particular if the contracting party knew (because of the presence of this 
provision) how important the contract or provision was to the other party.  See supra Section 
II.C.  These manipulations, then, may operate on many different levels and serve to address 
and influence several judgment heuristics or biases. 
 109.  Prentice, supra note 4, at 348. 
 110.  See, e.g., Carr v. CIGNA Sec. Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing 
the importance of the warning being provided “in capitals and bold face that it was a RISKY 
investment”); Elsken v. Network Multi-Family Sec. Corp., 49 F.3d 1470, 1474 (10th Cir. 
1995) (“Based upon a plain reading of the contract, Patricia Elsken agreed to the contract in 
its entirety as written.  She signed directly below a statement in conspicuous, bold capital 
letters declaring the signing party was agreeing to the entire Services Contract.”). 
 111.  See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 4, at 406 (observing that “[t]his desire to make 
themselves feel comfortable in their environment, coupled with the illusion of control 
discussed earlier, the desire to feel free from potential victimhood, and to believe that they 
live in a just world all factor together to make it easier for jurors and others to blame 
investors for their own losses, stupidity, and gullibility”). 
 112.  See Johnson v. Ubar, LLC, 150 Wash. App. 533, 538 (2009) (discussing the 
statutory requirement for contractual waivers to be conspicuous); Lee v. Goldline Int’l, Inc., 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52490, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2011) (noting that the provision 
in question was “prominently displayed, much of it is in all capital letters and bold, and it is 
worded in very plain English.  There is no reason to believe that a contracting customer 
would not notice the provision or would fail to understand its meaning.”); Widlar v. 
Matchmaker Int’l, 2002 Ohio 2836, at *2 (June 7, 2002) (noting that the terms and 
conditions, provided on the reverse side of the contract, were in a larger font than the rest of 
the contract); Grodel v. Arsham, 2007 Ohio 1715, at *9 (Apr. 12, 2007) (describing the 
contract as being “composed of a single page with the cancellation and refund provision 
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Conspicuousness, however, is defined within the context of the written 
contract itself, rather than within the broader contractual context.
113
  The 
buyer thus is liable under the written contract because she is blameworthy 
or because she acted with respect to the contract in a manner that suggests 
her blameworthiness, and she is blameworthy because the written contract 
suggests she is.
114
 
For example, the inclusion of a non-reliance clause has been promoted 
as preventing the buyer from asserting ex post “‘I lied when I told you I 
wasn’t relying on your prior statements’ and then seek[ing] damages for 
their contents.”
115
  A behavioralist review of such subscription agreements, 
however, suggests a different conclusion.  In particular, relying on oral 
representations instead of reviewing and emphasizing the written 
subscription agreement containing a disclaimer of representations clause is 
less blameworthy than has otherwise been suggested.
116
  Far from being the 
intentional liar regarding a disclaimer of oral representations, the investor 
appears from contextual evidence to be a much more benign figure.
117
  It 
also may be a mistake to exclude contextual evidence, such as evidence of 
the sophistication of the parties, which could be relevant to an adjudicator’s 
decision regarding the blameworthiness of the investor.
118
 
Similarly, recent federal credit card regulation promotes “clear and 
 
printed in the same print size as the other clauses”). 
 113.  Johnson, 150 Wash. App. at 1023 (listing the factors as “whether the waiver is set 
apart or hidden within other provisions, whether the heading is clear, whether the waiver is 
set off in capital letters or in bold type, whether there is a signature line below the waiver 
provision, what the language says above the signature line, and whether it is clear that the 
signature is related to the waiver.”); La Fata v. LA Fitness Int’l, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 7926, at *4–5 (Sep. 15, 2008) (finding that “La Fata cannot be heard to complain 
that he did not actually read or understand the provision” since it was “in bold-face type, in 
a font that is larger than the font for the rest of the agreement, with a capitalized heading 
identifying its purpose and characterizing it as ‘important.’”); Universal Underwriters Ins. 
Co. v. Allstates Air Cargo, Inc., 820 A.2d 988, 993 (Vt. 2003) (explaining its concern with 
“the lack of a highlighted warning” where a limitation of liability clause is included); 
Walnut Equip. Leasing Co., Inc. v. Moreno, 643 So. 2d 327, 332–33 n.3 (La. Ct. App. 1994) 
(examining the statutory requirements of being written, clear and conspicuous for waivers of 
warranties under Pennsylvania law, and to be satisfied where the provision was placed “in 
the middle of the front page, and was distinguished from the remaining provisions by bold, 
capitalized letters”). 
 114.  See supra note 113. 
 115.  Prentice, supra note 4, at 347 (citing Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F. 3d 381, 383 (7th 
Cir. 2000)). 
 116.  See generally Prentice, supra note 4, at 358–78 (examining the reasons that 
investors do not and rationally should not rely on such clauses). 
 117.  See id. at 378 (concluding that “[u]nfettered private ordering leaves investors at the 
mercy of sellers who would take advantage of the investors’ cognitive limitations and 
behavioral heuristics”). 
 118.  Id. at 347. 
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conspicuous” disclosure in credit card agreements.
119
  Such agreements, 
however, are unlikely to be read or negotiated by credit card holders as the 
result of behavioral biases even in the presence of more or better 
disclosure.
120
  These disclosure reforms, however, were promoted as 
helping “consumers make informed choices about using the right financial 
products and managing their own financial needs.”
121
  The same biases 
underlying the assertion that such disclosure is effective send similar 
signals to adjudicators regarding the blameworthiness of the debtors who 
complain about particular terms contained in their credit card agreements. 
What is most interesting and potentially problematic about these 
provisions is that they can suggest explicitly (e.g., through recitals or a 
provision stating an attorney was consulted) or implicitly (e.g., through 
multiple signature blocks) the state of contracting affairs without regard to 
the empirical truth of the description.  These descriptions also typically do 
not bear on material terms of the contract.  Instead, their appearance seems 
to be designed specifically and exclusively to present a favorable 
contracting context and thereby support both the enforceability of the 
contract and blameworthiness of a particular party.  The contract preparer 
thus implicitly acknowledges that context is important, while at the same 
time typically emphasizing the relevant contextual evidence within the 
written contract.  As we have seen, however, that context is subject to 
manipulation. 
 
 119.  See generally Zacks, supra note 36, at 1479–91 (discussing disclosure reforms of 
the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009). 
 120.  Id. at 1475.  This may be true regardless of whether the legislation mandates a 
specific form and manner of disclosure (which will reflect the legislature or agency’s beliefs 
about what type of disclosure is effective) as opposed to a standard for disclosure (which 
will reflect the adjudicator’s beliefs about what type of disclosure is effective).  The contract 
preparer’s ability to influence the latter, of course, is the primary subject of this Article. 
 121.  Press Release, Fact Sheet: Reforms to Protect American Credit Card Holders, 
White House (May 22, 2009), http: //whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-Reforms-
to-Protect-American-Credit-Card-Holders; Nancy Trejos, Major Changes in the Way Credit 
Cards Work, WASH. POST, May 23, 2009, at A13 (quoting Senator Christopher J. Dodd as 
indicating “[w]ith the signing of this bill, President Obama has ushered in a new era where 
consumer protections will be strong and reliable, rules transparent and fair, and statements 
clear and informative”); Paul Gores, Shackles made plain: New rules will disclose pitfalls of 
making monthly minimum payments on credit cards, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 31, 
2010, at D1 (Claire Anne Resop, bankruptcy attorney and U.S. Bankruptcy Court trustee:  “I 
do believe a lot of consumers have no idea how long it’s going to take them to pay off their 
bill if they only make the minimum payment . . . . I think a lot of consumers will take note 
of that because they don’t sit and figure it out.”). 
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III. RESPONDING TO THE MANIPULATION CRITIQUE 
The critique offered in Section II suggests that contract preparers may 
manipulate our ability to assess the blameworthiness of contractual actors 
after the fact.  Section III responds to this critique by offering justifications 
for, and rejections of, the scenarios and outcomes described above. 
A. A Written Contract Sets Forth the Agreement on Context 
One can initially respond to the critique outlined above by noting that 
a written contract is, in some significant sense, intended to reflect a 
voluntary agreement to transfer property rights.
122
  Thus, if parties describe 
(in the written contract) the context in which the parties have agreed to 
transfer their property rights, then we should respect their agreement as to 
what that context was.  If, for example, the provisions of the written 
agreement provide that I had access to counsel during the course of 
negotiations, then the adjudicator would be correct to presume, whether 
through the use of judgment heuristics or otherwise, that I either (i) had 
access to counsel or (ii) voluntarily agreed to suffer the legal consequences 
of agreeing that I did have access to counsel, regardless of whether I 
actually had such access. 
Another way of framing this response is to assert that all contract 
provisions are voluntary stipulations and should be viewed as terms of the 
contract, regardless of whether they are relevant to the “deal” or the 
contracting context.  For example, if a provision indicates that the contact 
preparer would not have entered into the agreement absent the other 
contracting party’s agreement to a particular provision, then presumably, 
this is the stipulated understanding and enforceable agreement of the 
party.
123
  It is not, accordingly, some sort of manipulation designed to 
describe the contract preparer’s reasonableness or sincere motives.  
Similarly, it is not inconsistent for the contract to “tell a story” in 
accordance with behavioral biases (and portrayals of blameworthiness) if 
the overall purpose of the contract is to ensure that the written contract is 
respected as the agreed-upon state of affairs.  This may be particularly true 
given that “[b]iased assessments in hindsight are well-understood, and it is 
therefore not necessarily unfair to subject potential defendants [in this 
 
 122.  Farnsworth, supra note 48, § 11.1 (discussing contract rights as a type of intangible 
property, the transfer of which is governed by special rules). 
 123.  It similarly could be designed to assist one party in the event that the party sought 
to be excused from performance under the contract (e.g., in the event that the material term 
was not fulfilled).  My thanks to Meredith Miller for highlighting this issue. 
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instance, contracting parties] to them.”
124
 
Additionally, if we value the written contract because of its certainty 
of enforcement, then no one is harmed by including contractual provisions 
that reinforce such certainty.
125
  Moreover, if we are concerned with the 
ability of adjudicators to apply the contract as written, we should expect 
contracts, as drafted by those who prepare and negotiate them, to tell the 
“right story” so that adjudicators’ behavioral biases and judgment heuristics 
correspond with the “right” contract law doctrine outcome.  We should 
want to avoid discussion of the situation outside of the written contract and 
determine if the written contract reflects the correct consent or promise.  As 
a result, we can prevent the reinvention of the agreement of the parties.  In 
the securities fraud context, for example, judges have sometimes excluded 
evidence of oral fraud if the investment subscription agreement 
contradicted the oral misrepresentations.
126
  Such exclusion prevents a 
seller from being uncertain about being protected ex post “against plausible 
liars and gullible jurors.”
127
  The same uncertainty could arise if evidence 
were permitted regarding the contracting context beyond that which is 
presented in the contract itself. 
I would respond to these objections with two distinct lines of 
argument.  First, with respect to the difference between context 
manipulation and actual recitation of material contract terms, it admittedly 
will be a close call in several instances, such as a provision regarding the 
motives of the parties when entering into an agreement described above.  It 
does not follow, however, that a contract, particularly one between a 
“repeat player” and a non-commercial party or involving other potentially 
troubling contexts, should be permitted to contain terms that contradict the 
 
 124.  Rachlinski, supra note 76, at 602.  Rachlinski is addressing such issues in the tort 
context, but an individual’s perception of the likelihood of biased ex post judgments 
certainly would apply in the contract context as well. 
 125.  Farnsworth, supra note 48, § 1.6 (“Unless agreements can be relied on, they are of 
little use” (regardless of whether a person does in fact rely on the agreement in question)); 
RANDY E. BARNETT, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: CONTRACTS xix-xx (2010) 
(“Contracts enhance our ability to rely on the commitment of another person by creating a 
right to legal enforcement of that commitment in case of its breach. So the second concern 
of contract law is protecting the reliance of each party on the commitment of the other.”). 
 126.  Prentice, supra note 4, at 345-49 (discussing two such cases); see supra Section 
II.D for a discussion of the parol evidence rule and similar contractual outcomes. 
 127.  Id. at 346 (quoting Carr v. CIGNA Secs. Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 546).  The “curious 
rhetorical feature” of courts to chastise certain contracting parties for behaving poorly in 
their opinions can be understood as “the scolding of [the] case.”  Sidney W. DeLong, 
Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: Some Realism About the New Formalism (with Particular 
Reference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 33 (2001).  In particular, 
DeLong notes how formalist courts may be quick “to chastise losing parties for failing to 
read agreements before signing or failing to get critical promises in writing.”  Id.  
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truth of the contracting context.
128
  For example, in the context of securities 
fraud, the prospectus and other investment agreements should not logically 
be used to exculpate the seller from fraudulent oral representations given in 
the broader contracting context of the seller-investor relationship.
129
  
Similarly, if a written contract suggests a particular state of affairs with 
respect to the context, whether regarding access to counsel or otherwise 
suggesting the voluntariness of the transaction, the written contract should 
not necessarily be dominant when reviewing contextual evidence.
130
  It may 
be true that the “perceived fairness of the system of civil liability” would be 
undermined if “repeat players . . . notice the tendency of biased judgments 
to raise standards after the fact, as might judges.”
131
  On the other hand, if 
we show such concern for the repeat players when the hindsight bias cuts 
against them, presumably we can and should be concerned when the 
hindsight bias favors them.
132
 
Second, the purpose of this Article is not to articulate a view towards 
dismissing the written contract, but instead it is to contemplate a fuller view 
of the written contract, particularly with respect to situational contexts and 
their impact on adjudicators.  If written contracts evidence an awareness of 
ex post behavioral biases and situational evidence and attempt to 
manipulate adjudicators’ perceptions, then perhaps we should be open to 
conclusions that contradict the view of the written contract as sacred.  
 
 128.  See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 76, at 602 (arguing that “an unbiased judgment 
clearly would be superior to a biased one”). 
 129.  See Prentice, supra note 4, at 419 (“[M]any courts have given effect to disclaimers, 
no-reliance clauses, and/or merger clauses . . . . These cases encourage fraud and are 
inconsistent with congressional intent under the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts.  Behavioral analysis 
demonstrates that they are also unwise policy.”). 
 130.  In response, one may assert that “does not” is not equivalent to “cannot”; that is, 
that merely because individuals do not subjectively comprehend a particular contractual 
term does not mean that the individual is incapable of doing so, which in turn leads to the 
conclusion that the individual should be bound by the individual’s objectively manifested 
consent to a term, regardless of whether subjective comprehension was achieved.  This 
objection, however, does not address why contracts are structured so as to appear to 
generate subjective comprehension or consent (e.g., through plain English or multiple 
signature blocks), which is the central focus of this Article. 
 131.  Rachlinski, supra note 76, at 602. 
 132.  To some extent, this is an argument about the importance of subjective 
comprehension.  Contract law, as discussed above, is premised on objective manifestations 
of consent.  If, however, people make those manifestations routinely and without 
contemplating legal significance, and moreover, if the contract preparer knows that, then it 
is not clear why the manifestations (signing or clicking through a contract) should be 
respected, or at least, it is not clear why they should be respected based on features that do 
not reflect subjective comprehension.  The defenders of contract law, in some sense, try to 
have it both ways by asserting that only consent matters but then relying on features of 
contracts which do not necessarily implicate actual promise or consent. 
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Admittedly, one may be reluctant to accept, much less embrace, a 
worldview that diminishes both the voluntary capabilities of a contracting 
party as well as the manipulability of adjudicators.
133
  This reluctance, 
however, cannot and should not be defended based on our illusions 
regarding situational influences or the importance of such illusions to the 
legal system.
134
  In addition, the importance of predictability of a legal 
system’s privately ordered outcomes is potentially diminished if the 
particular outcomes are not those desired by the individuals involved or if 
such outcomes have been manipulated.
135
 
Arguments about the importance of contract law doctrine alone (such 
as focusing solely on whether there was consent or promise) also likely 
ignore the “blaming” that occurs when an adjudicator determines a 
particular lawsuit.  The “blameworthiness” of various actors with respect to 
a contract lawsuit is an important factor in adjudication.
136
  If adjudicators 
are already making conclusions about an individual’s disposition regardless 
of whether such evidence is presented or excluded, then a contract that 
introduces such evidence could influence the conclusion about a particular 
person.  Put another way, we should expect our conclusions about whether 
the contract law requirements have been met in the particular instance to be 
influenced in some respect by the level of blameworthiness as presented in 
the contract.  For example, it has been demonstrated in the tort context that 
jurors employ holistic judgmental strategies, which means, for example, 
that jurors consider blameworthiness in contexts where the law does not 
require it, such as the calculation of damages.
137
 
The difference in the contract context, of course, is that the written 
contract may be prepared in contemplation of such jurors’ blameworthiness 
judgments and structured accordingly.  There may be, as a result, instances 
where the contractual evidence of the contracting context (e.g., if it was 
 
 133.  Hanson & Kysar, supra note 12, at 747–48. 
 134.  Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 7, at 179 (arguing that “our greatest dispositional 
act may be to acknowledge that we are situational characters and to choose to understand 
and gain some voice and control over the situation that largely controls us. In that very 
important sense, we do have a choice”). 
 135.  See, e.g., Welle, supra note 27, at 528 (criticizing particular securities deregulation 
advocates of “simple, bright-line rules” promoting private ordering (and certainty and 
predictability in outcomes) as appearing “willing to sacrifice the interests of the community 
to protect the economic interests of certain individuals”). 
 136.  Park, supra note 3, at 739–40 (discussing the various dispositionist conclusions that 
are made by adjudicators, regardless of the presentation of relevant evidence). 
 137.  Neal Feigenson et al., Effect of Blameworthiness and Outcome Severity on 
Attributions of Responsibility and Damage Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases, 21 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 597, 609 (1997) (describing the varying effect of blame on jurors’ 
damage decisions depending on the severity of the outcome caused by a tortfeasor). 
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coercive) contributes to a particular dispositional conclusion (the 
contracting party was “hasty” or “lazy” and should be blamed for all 
contractual outcomes), which may have implications beyond the 
contracting context.  Thus, the contracting party with the “bad” disposition 
is potentially liable for a higher amount of damages based on dispositionist 
conclusions that are irrelevant to traditional contractual damages 
calculation metrics. 
Lastly, it is somewhat tautological to argue that we should diminish or 
disregard contextual defenses based on a written contract that presupposes 
and reinforces the voluntariness of the contract.  Under that line of 
argument, the situation or context regarding consent is irrelevant because 
the written contract indicates that consent was voluntary.  It is based on a 
powerful presumption of consent where the physical evidence of consent is 
the most significant factor in determining the existence of a contract.  Of 
course, this does not mean that the written contract is incorrect or that the 
contracting context was not as might be desired.  It does mean, however, 
that we should recognize the choice and the situation in which the choice is 
made and consider whether the contract choice reflects the reality in 
decision-making, particularly when considering reforms to contract law. 
B. Cognitive Biases and Judgment Heuristics Are Effective 
As another response to the manipulation concerns outlined in this 
Article, one may argue that the behavioral biases and counterfactual 
analysis may lead to accurate conclusions and judgments, or at least cannot 
be shown to be demonstrably incorrect.
138
  For example, multiple signatures 
to a written contract may in fact be the single most important factor in 
determining whether consent was provided in a voluntary context and on a 
knowing basis.  If the Internet user did not want the particular computer 
software, so goes the argument, then she was not required to click her 
assent to the contract.  In addition, others have described the superior 
ability of human beings over computers with respect to solving particular 
 
 138.  Feigenson, supra note 3, at 119; Funder, supra note 3, at 83 (noting that with 
respect to the accuracy of social judgment, “the question is probably unanswerable.  It can 
only have meaning in relation to a second question:  Compared to what?”); Tetlock, supra 
note 6, at 468 (arguing that “response tendencies that look like errors and biases given one 
set of functionalist assumptions often look prudent given another set of functionalist 
assumptions.  Before labeling an effect an error or bias, one should consider:  (a) the 
interpersonal and political goals that people are trying to achieve by making judgments of a 
particular type”).  In any event, one would like to have empirical data demonstrating 
whether certain contractual provisions, in a “real-world” setting, do in fact have the ability 
to manipulate ex post adjudicator perceptions of the contracting context. 
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problems as being attributable to the “broad array of real-world knowledge 
and experience” available to human beings, which presumably still 
involves the cognitive biases that otherwise are criticized.
139
  Thus, our 
cognitive biases may be serving us well. 
The issue, though, is that even if such judgment processes are largely 
effective, which is not conceded here, it does not necessarily follow that 
“false indicators” should be permitted or respected.  For example, if the 
written contract evokes a particular event or act (through the inclusion of 
multiple signature blocks and an “attorney consulted” provision) as the 
event most easily changeable, adjudicators may ignore the particular event, 
act, or context that was “least likely” and “thus most likely to have ‘made 
the difference’ between what happened and what could have happened.”
140
  
In the contracting context, the situational pressures of a particular situation 
may be the least likely factor (such as looming bankruptcy in the 
forbearance agreement context), which suggests that, at least through the 
use of the simulation heuristic, if the situational pressures had not been 
present, the contract would not have been executed or a particular party 
may be less blameworthy.
141
  The written contract, as described above, may 
nevertheless obfuscate or ignore that fact. 
C. Contract Law Permits Extrinsic Evidence of Context 
Existing contract law doctrine may also address some of the concerns 
outlined in this Article.  Over time, contract law was modified by the rise 
of the unconscionability doctrine, which was intended to prevent, inter alia, 
the stronger contracting party from committing oral fraud and breaking 
their promises without recourse for the weaker party.
142
  Similarly, duress 
 
 139.  Funder, supra note 3, at 82 (noting that at a minimum, “[t]he presuppositions, 
expectations, and even ‘biases’ that some social psychologists seemingly want to eliminate 
from the judgment process are the same things that researchers in AI [artificial intelligence] 
are finding necessary—but extremely difficult—to incorporate into that process”). 
 140.  Feigenson, supra note 3, at 119–20. 
 141.  Of course, understanding the situation does not necessarily mean excusing the act.  
But see John H. Harvey et. al., How Fundamental is “The Fundamental Attribution 
Error”?, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 346, 347 (1981) (discussing how “[t]he 
assignment of causality entails an interpretation of events, and this most often requires that 
one go beyond the information given in a particular situation.  It is often the case that an 
event clearly does not have a unique (or comprehensible, in an ultimate sense) 
interpretation”). 
 142.  Prentice, supra note 4, at 390.  Prentice criticizes securities fraud case decisions 
that “roll back forty years of contract law reforms and again allow fraudsters to make 
promises, breach them, and do so with impunity.”  Id.; Warkentine, supra note 8, at 480 
(quoting U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2003)) (“An unconscionability analysis focuses on (1) the 
bargaining process leading to purported agreement to the terms (sometimes referred to as 
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may be an available defense to a contracting party if the context was 
sufficiently problematic.
143
  These doctrines suggest a shift towards 
recognizing the relevance of evidence of “blameworthiness” and context 
outside of the written contract itself.
144
  These exceptions thus may be a 
sufficient safeguard against the manipulation of ex post reaction to a 
contract context through the written contract itself. 
Even under “evolved” contract law, however, the limited 
circumstances of duress or unconscionability have extremely high 
thresholds to overcome in order to rebut the presumption of enforceability 
of a contract where a manifestation of assent has been provided.
145
  In the 
absence of a bad actor, in most cases the person creating the duress or 
procedural unconscionability (resulting in the unconscionable result), we 
are unaware of and do not appear to want to be aware of other relevant 
situational pressures.
146
  In any event, the failure to recognize situational 
 
‘procedural unconscionability’), and (2) the substantive ‘fairness’ of the disputed terms 
(‘substantive unconscionability’)”; Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the 
Regulation of Bargains: Procedural Unconscionability and the Importance of Context, 2006 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 925, 940 (2006) (“An unconscionable term or agreement must exhibit a 
lack of meaningful choice for the disadvantaged party (procedural unconscionability) and 
contain a burdensome or unfair term (substantive unconscionability) imposed on the 
disadvantaged party.”) (emphasis added). 
 143.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 579 (9th ed. 2009) (defining duress as “a threat of harm 
made to compel a person to do something against his or her will or judgment; esp., a 
wrongful threat made by one person to compel a manifestation of seeming assent by another 
person to a transaction without real volition.”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 48 § 4.16 
(describing duress as “[c]oercive behavior [in the] form of physical compulsion or of 
threat,” which, in the case of a threat, must be improper, induce assent, and be “sufficiently 
grave to justify the victim’s assent.”). 
 144.  Similarly, exceptions to the parol evidence rule permit the introduction of evidence 
to demonstrate mistake, misrepresentation, or duress, even in the presence of an integrated 
written contract. Farnsworth, supra note 48, § 7.4. 
 145.  Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 7, at 164 (noting that “only an extremely narrow 
range of situational factors count—those of dispositionally bad actors. . . . But these 
exceptions do not reveal a true sensitivity to situation; they expose only the tiny and 
predictable exception to dispositionism that proves the rule.”).  We tend to see only salient 
actors as being a relevant situation (the “800-pound gorilla” that forces us to give up our 
seat) and otherwise ignore it.  Id. at 165.  In addition, the success rate for pleading 
unconscionability is low, even for those who (reluctantly) plead it.  Morant, supra note 142, 
at 947. 
 146.  Arthur Allen Leff described procedural unconscionability as “bargaining 
naughtiness.”  Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code:  The Emperor’s New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967).  Hanson and Yosifon note that:  “[e]ven in the 
exceptional, backwater doctrine of duress, the focus of contract law remains resolutely 
dispositionist—the will of the victim must be overcome in order for the doctrine to be 
implicated.  And because we see most behavior as resulting from individual will, it is only 
the very palpable situational force of an unscrupulous person making a fear-inducing threat 
that can trump the presumption that it is an individual’s will in charge.  Hanson & Yosifon, 
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pressures beyond “bad actors” or visible threats suggests that written 
contracts can be utilized to reinforce this failure.
147
 
Beyond traditional criticisms of the shortcomings of the doctrines of 
unconscionability and duress, this Article suggests that our ex post 
adjudication is tainted in those situations that do not include intentional or 
knowing wrongdoing by the stronger contracting party.  In particular, an 
examination of the adjudication of unconscionability would be relevant to 
this argument.  In accordance with what attribution theory would suggest, 
one can view unconscionability as the adjudicator’s determination that a 
particular term is not fair or desirable based on the relative 
blameworthiness of the parties, presumably based, in part, upon the 
contract’s context.  Even consent theorists resort to this when dealing with 
the limits of consent.  For example, in the “click-through” Internet license 
agreements and other form contract agreements, Barnett suggests that the 
click is and should be a legally recognizable consent to be bound by all of 
those terms of the license agreement that may be reasonably expected.
148
  
 
supra note 10, at 14.  The authors also note that even in those rare situations, it is primarily 
those individuals who are viewed by society as being unusually weak-willed who may be 
subject to such forces.  Id.; see, e.g., Bell v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, 358 Fed. App’x. 
498, 503 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that, in order to find procedural unconscionability, the 
“weaker party is prevented by market facts, timing or other pressures from being able to 
contract with another party on more favorable terms or to refrain from contracting at all”) 
(quoting E. Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So.2d 709, 716 (Miss. 2002)).  Indeed, the lack of 
emphasis on procedural unconsionability can be attributed to our lack of desire or ability to 
grasp the situation.  Morant, supra note 142, at 951 (citing cases that confirm his thesis that 
“common law decision-makers rely primarily on the substantive unconscionability of a case 
to justify relief to the disadvantaged party”).  Morant concludes that “decision-makers who 
interpret the common law of contract should incorporate a realist’s perspective of power as 
they apply the doctrine of unconscionability.”  Id. at 928. 
 147.  See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 7, at 302 (“[T]here are certainly many other 
features of our internal situations that can exercise as much influence over our conduct as 
does the more palpable situation of fear, yet those remain hidden by our dispositionism and 
are unseen in the law.  Restricted by this dispositionist framework, the common law of 
contract has not developed categories of influence beyond salient external threats and 
internal fears through which parties can formulate their claims.  Unless a choice can be 
shown to have been arbitrary, it is presumed to be the expression of an unfettered will.”).  
For example, the presentation of a contract in “plain English” may suggest the absence of 
procedural unconscionability, regardless of the effectiveness of such language.  See cases 
cited supra note 101. 
 148.  Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 639 
(2002) (“If I am right, parties who sign forms or click ‘I agree’ are manifesting their consent 
to be bound by the unread terms in the forms.  They would rather run the risk of agreeing to 
unread terms than either (a) decline to agree or (b) read the terms.  Refusing to enforce all of 
these terms would violate their freedom to contract.  But parties who click ‘I agree’ are not 
realistically manifesting their assent to radically unexpected terms.  Enforcing such an 
unread term would violate the parties’ freedom from contract.”) (emphasis omitted).  
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The ex post determination of “reasonable expectations,” however, is 
fraught with the same pitfalls of behavioral biases outlined in this Article 
because it essentially asks the adjudicator to assess the blameworthiness of 
the contracting actor as to what he or she should have reasonably 
expected.
149
  In any event, the context suggesting what would have been 
reasonably expected is suddenly center stage, which, as we have seen, can 
be manipulated. 
Moreover, the absence of a bright line for unconscionability may 
reveal too much for contract law theorists who prefer the bright line of an 
objective manifestation of assent.  If there is a limit in their minds as to 
what counts as a manifestation of assent based on the situation, it needs to 
be clearly defined.  Or, put another way, if there are contexts where 
subjective understanding is necessary (or where contractual freedom is 
lacking although necessary), such as what may be “reasonably expected” in 
a click-through license agreement, then why not describe those contexts 
clearly ahead of time?  If it is not clearly defined, then we are asking the 
adjudicators to decide ex post based on some set of ambiguous factors 
whether the contract should be binding; and, in any event, their decision 
will be based at least in part upon a determination of the blameworthiness 
of the actors.
150
  As discussed above, the factors they look to will logically 
 
Similarly, with respect to standardized agreements, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
211 suggests that the determination of whether a party agreed to contractual terms in a 
standardized contract depends on whether “similarly situated people (1) reasonably would 
have expected such a term to be included in that contract and (2) would have understood 
that the document was contractual in nature.”  Warkentine, supra note 8, at 508. This 
approach recognizes the importance of the situation, but as Warkentine notes, it was not 
widely adopted except in certain insurance cases.  Id.  The UCC Article 2 did not contain a 
provision addressing consent to “unbargained-for terms” in standardized contracts, but 
revisions that would have utilized a “reasonable expectations” test were proposed for 
consumer form contracts.  Id. at 510.  These revisions were ultimately dropped in the final 
approved version of Article 2.  Id. 
 149.  Id. at 484 (noting that “[d]ecisions based on unconscionability are fact sensitive 
and, to a great extent, reflect trial judges’ subjective determinations.  As a result, although 
there are now many cases that address unconscionability, they have little value as 
precedents”).  Other judges may avoid the issue by focusing on an assent analysis instead of 
an unconscionability analysis.  Id. at 520. 
 150.   One author suggests, for purposes of determining procedural unconscionability 
(which implicates blameworthiness), a review of the following contextual factors: “[t]he 
advantaged party’s perceptions, beliefs, and biases related to the disadvantaged party. . ., the 
limited choices of the disadvantaged party,” and the “bargaining power of the respective 
parties with power defined as education, knowledge, and bargaining sophistication.”  
Morant, supra note 142, at 958; FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, §4.28 (listing numerous 
factors to be considered for purposes of ascertaining procedural unconscionability).  Under 
Florida law, on the other hand, courts must look to:   
(1) the manner in which the contract was entered into; (2) the relative 
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include the appearance of the contract as well as its effect on the 
contracting party.  Thus, we may be allowing the contract preparer to 
manipulate our perceptions ex post of whether the manifestation was freely 
given. 
D. The Limits of Situational Awareness 
Even if we desired to make adjudicators “aware” of the situational 
contract pressures and resist “contracting blame,” one could also argue that 
there is no assurance that adjudicators are able to perceive or process those 
pressures effectively. 
In the process of determining the cause of behavior, people need to be 
made aware of situational pressures in order to be able to determine that 
such pressures contributed to a particular outcome.
151
  As was seen in 
Section II supra, the design of many provisions of written contract appear 
to be designed to present an exclusive and one-sided view that there were 
no troubling situational pressures present at the time of contract execution.  
Indeed, even in the absence of such contractual provisions, people have 
difficulty imagining “the situation,” as it may not have physical attributes.  
After all, “[o]ne cannot see, smell, taste, or hear ‘audience pressure,’ which 
exists only in the mind of the public speaker.”
152
  Similarly, in contract 
scenarios, it may be difficult for an adjudicator to envision all of the 
situational pressures present in the contract formation context.
153
  It has 
been noted, for example, that sophisticated investors may be unlikely to 
examine or understand prospectuses because of the relationship that exists 
between the investor and the broker advising the investment, and this 
 
bargaining power of the parties and whether the complaining party had a 
meaningful choice at the time the contract was entered into; (3) whether the 
terms were merely presented on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis; and (4) the 
complaining party’s ability and opportunity to understand the disputed terms of 
the contract.   
Tranchant v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35099, at *14 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 
31, 2011) (quoting Pendergrast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1135 (11th Cir. 
2010)). 
 151.  Gilbert & Malone, supra note 4, at 24. 
 152.  Id. at 25.  Gilbert summarizes that “it can be difficult to attain awareness of the 
forces that are compelling an actor’s behavior, and when observers lack such awareness they 
are predictably prone to correspondence bias [the fundamental attribution error].”  Id. 
 153.  It may be, however, that certain contracts do trigger memories or recognition of the 
situational pressures present.  For example, in the rental care contract scenario, since many 
jurors presumably have rented a car before, they would presumably be aware of the 
situational pressures present.  This does not diminish, however, a written contract’s attempt 
to promote a particular ex post conception of the contract context or diminish the 
adjudicator’s ability to discern the context. 
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relationship is obviously external to the written agreement.
154
  Thus, 
making adjudicators aware of such a situation may prove to be difficult. 
There also may be limits to the effectiveness of this awareness, as 
individuals still may be unable to determine accurately what a reasonable 
reaction to the situational pressures would be.
155
  For example, people 
typically have inflated and unrealistic expectations of how others should 
have behaved in light of situational pressures if they rely on an inflated and 
unrealistic notion of how they would have behaved in the same situation.
156
  
One would expect the same sort of behavioral biases that affect people’s 
decision-making process in the first place to play a role in this.  While the 
optimism bias results in individuals underestimating the risk of a particular 
negative outcome when making a decision, the hindsight bias may cause 
that same individual to judge another more harshly.
157
  In hindsight, we 
may believe that the risks should have been obvious to another and that we 
would have acted differently, while we, when acting and viewing a 
situation prospectively, may be subject to the same biases that affected the 
other in the same situation.
158
  Moreover, encouraging adjudicators to think 
more broadly or deeply about a particular situation may not result in more 
accurate judgments because such individuals may focus on the “wrong” 
information.
159
 
The existence and prevalence of the fundamental attribution error and 
 
 154.  Langevoort, supra note 30, at 631 (claiming “that once a broker successfully 
cultivates trust, willing reliance by the sophisticated investor—imprudent though it may 
seem in hindsight—is quite likely and, for that reason alone, worthy of some protection”). 
 155.  Hastie & Dawes, supra note 60, at 190 (“A person who attempts to understand 
everything can easily end up understanding nothing”); Gilbert & Malone, supra note 4, at 27 
(“In short, people may incorrectly estimate the power of certain situations to induce certain 
behaviors.”). 
 156.  Gilbert & Malone, supra note 4, at 27.  Gilbert and Malone discuss how an 
individual may use his or her “imagined response” in a particular situation to determine 
whether someone else, acting in the same situation, acted appropriately.  This is “risky 
business,” because individuals do not act uniformly and an individual’s perception about 
how he or she would have acted in a particular situation is not always accurate.  Id. 
 157.  See Langevoort, supra note 30, at 672 (noting the “‘false consensus effect,’ 
whereby lawyers and judges assess reasonableness through the rose-colored lens of how 
they think they would behave under similar circumstances”).  But see Hastie & Viscusi, 
supra note 76, at 916 (arguing that judges assess risk in hindsight better than juries). 
 158.  Baron & Hershey, supra note 7, at 578 (suggesting that “people may confuse their 
evaluations of decisions with the evaluations of the consequences themselves”). 
 159.  Tetlock, supra note 6, at 466 (“Sometimes encouraging integrative complexity, far 
from debiasing judgment, may make matters worse.”).  Tetlock notes that merely 
incentivizing a more complicated approach to judgment did not make individuals “more 
discriminating consumers of the information at their disposal”.  Id. at 467; see also Harvey 
supra note 141, at 347 (noting that “[s]ituational biases and errors may be just as 
‘fundamental’ as dispositional biases . . . .”). 
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related behavioral biases nevertheless suggest that dispositionist 
conclusions about the decision-maker cannot be avoided, regardless of 
whether relevant evidence exists.
160
  If dispositionist conclusions will be 
made regardless of whether evidence is presented, then permitting 
inaccurate evidence (evidence in the contract suggesting a particular 
contracting context) might result in particular and troubling ex post 
conclusions about contracting parties.
161
  At a minimum then, it is not clear 
that excluding evidence that presents a more accurate picture of the 
situation is logical or defensible based on the prevalence of the 
fundamental attribution error and related biases in judgment.
162
 
E. Written Contract as Practical and Promoter of Responsible 
Behavior 
Another justification for focusing on the context presented by the 
written contract (and ignoring situational influences such as oral 
representations or trust in the contracting parties’ relationship) is that 
contract law can thereby provide a clear warning to contracting parties to 
“be wary and skeptical” of the contract preparer’s behavior or relationship 
outside of the written contract.
163
  The desirability of enabling particular 
 
 160.  Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 75, at 92 (noting that “the hindsight bias has 
proven resistant to most debiasing techniques”); Park, supra note 3, at 740 (“Fundamental 
attribution error research indicates that human reasoners tend not only to make dispositional 
judgments freely, but also to overestimate the power of dispositions.  But the legal policy 
implications are unclear because the research seems to show that humans will make 
dispositional attributions and overestimate the power of dispositions whether or not they are 
given relevant data about the history of the person whose disposition is being judged.”). 
 161.  See, e.g., Baron & Hershey, supra note 7, at 578 (suggesting the “[m]ere 
understanding that such confusion contaminates these evaluations is not enough to eliminate 
it”); Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 75, at 102 (concluding that “[t]he ubiquity of 
foreseeability judgments in law suggests the need for developing effective debiasing 
techniques”). 
 162.  Baron & Hershey, supra note 7, at 578 (suggesting the usefulness of evaluating 
decisions “from the decision maker’s viewpoint at the time of the decision, both for judging 
the decision maker and for promulgating standards for the future” in order to counteract the 
hindsight bias).  Feigenson also discusses how attorneys, when attempting to diminish an 
adjudicator’s perception of a particular actor’s responsibility for an accident, can be 
expected to influence the adjudicator to identify with the particular actor.  By identifying 
with a particular actor, the circumstances (the context) and other actors become more 
apparent, which suggests that someone or something else other than the actor’s disposition 
will be blamed by the adjudicator.  Feigenson, supra note 3, at 146–47.  In the context of an 
accident, these evocations may not be accurate, but their employment and effectiveness may 
suggest that the attribution errors committed in light of a written contract can be 
counterbalanced by presentation of a more complete context. 
 163.  Langevoort, supra note 30, at 684 (suggesting that “judges may be trying to 
channel behavior by creating an incentive to read” by finding a “duty to read” subscription 
ZACKS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  3:14 PM 
2012] CONTRACTING BLAME 217 
 
behavioral biases, such as the hindsight bias, may turn on whether the 
social actions promoted by an ex post review influenced by such biases are 
beneficial.  For example, a rule protecting against the hindsight bias has 
been provided for business managers (the business judgment rule) and not 
for all professionals.
164
  This may reflect our desire for:  
lawyers or accountants t[o] guarantee their work with a system of 
de facto strict liability [that is, one that permits the influence of 
the hindsight bias], or take an occasional excess of precautions, 
but corporate managers operating under such a regime will be apt 
to betray the real interests of their shareholders.
165
   
Similarly, in the contracting context, we may desire contracting parties to 
act with the knowledge that their contracting behavior will be reviewed 
with the full application of any hindsight bias, with the end result hopefully 
being that contracting parties act “non-negligently” in their own interests.
166
 
If, however, strong situational pressures exist at the time of 
contracting, it may be very difficult for contracting parties ex ante to 
internalize such a legal message, such as when there is a strong or trusting 
relationship between the parties.
167
  Obvious differences between 
professionals and ordinary contracting parties will also exist in many 
instances, which suggests that the harsher regime enabling the hindsight 
bias should not necessarily be promoted when less sophisticated parties (or 
parties relying on fiduciary or similar relationships) are involved.
168
  In any 
event, the more pressing issue is whether the situational pressures can be 
recognized ex post and if such recognition can be skewed through 
contractual preparation.  Thus, although we may still want to ask whether 
 
agreements, which may preclude fraud claims). 
 164.  Rachlinski, supra note 76, at 622. 
 165.  Id. at 623. 
 166.  Tetlock, supra note 6, at 468 (arguing that the fundamental attribution error may be 
a positive normative outcome if we would like to hold others strictly accountable for their 
behavior, as “[o]ne way of pressuring other people to behave is by indicating to them that 
one has a low tolerance for justifications or excuses and that one will treat their behavior as 
automatically diagnostic of underlying intentions”).  It also may be argued that a contract 
exists in part to avoid the hindsight bias being applied against the contract preparer, who 
may be the party with the most power, control, and sophistication, which could in hindsight 
suggest that the contract preparer should be “more” liable in any particular loss situation. 
 167.  Langevoort, supra note 30, at 672 (noting in the investor context that where 
“extensive trust [the situational pressure] is common and predictable, however, it would take 
an unusually strong and clear legal message to dissuade investors from relying ex ante [on 
that trust]”). 
 168.  Bainbridge, supra note 77, at 1042–43 (suggesting that “habits” as decision-
making heuristics can lead to “suboptimal decisions in particular circumstances,” which 
means that “legal intervention” should be evaluated based on whether those “habits” are 
“rational rather than myopic”). 
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the exclusion of situational evidence is preferable to its inclusion in terms 
of efficiency, we should also consider whether the exclusion of situational 
evidence distorts the adjudicator’s perspective.  Obviously, the 
effectiveness of a particular doctrine or reform in promoting “efficient” 
behavior is a valid consideration in support of the doctrine or reform, but 
that does not necessarily mean that the effect of the doctrine or reform upon 
an adjudicator’s ability to discern the situational context accurately should 
be ignored.  Indeed, if a reform promotes efficient behavior but does not 
appear to do so from an adjudicator’s perspective, then the reform’s 
effectiveness may be blunted.  Conversely, if a reform (such as plain 
English) does not promote efficient behavior but does appear to do so from 
an adjudicator’s perspective, then the reform’s effectiveness will be 
overstated. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR CONTRACT LAW 
This Article suggests an alternative explanation for the existence and 
prevalence of particular contract provisions, one that should be troubling 
for both traditional contract law theorists as well as “situationists.”  The 
alternative explanation, while difficult to decouple from the more 
“virtuous” explanation of contract where parties do in fact set forth their 
exclusive and exhaustive stipulations of terms (including contextual terms), 
is both plausible and probable.
169
  At a minimum, a more complete and 
compelling response to the alternative explanation offered in this Article is 
warranted.
170
  If, for example, ex post perceptions of the voluntariness of 
assent, which is fundamental to contract legal doctrine, can be manipulated 
ex ante by contract preparers, then contract law theories need to be able to 
justify such manipulation or admit such manipulations as a weakness 
 
 169.  This is particularly true if the context of a contract is as important as some believe.  
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 7, at 302–03 (“[I]f the situation was as profoundly 
recognized in our laws as it is influential in our lives, the role of the situation would be 
presumptively paramount, rather than presumptively irrelevant.”). 
 170.  See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1471, 1487–88 (1998) (suggesting that, although conventional economics 
explanations often have “the advantage of simplicity and parsimony,” they also often do so 
“at the expense of any real predictive power.”).  Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler also note “[i]t is 
not even clear that there are steady or stable background preferences that might be 
‘informed.’  The preferences can themselves be an artifact of the method of informing.”  Id. 
at 1535.  Indeed, “[i]f, as the evidence suggests, preferences are unstable, constructed, and 
manipulable, this should give rise to concern about the legitimacy of our systems . . . . 
Hiding our heads as a defense tactic succeeds only when the danger is just in our heads.”  
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 7, at 188. 
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within the current state of contract law.
171
  Moreover, such justifications 
cannot rely on the subjective intent of the parties to create such an ex post 
perception because, empirically, in many situations, the contracting party 
that did not prepare the contract simply had no such intent.  This has 
obvious implications for the contract law doctrine, but one should also not 
overlook the impact of “blameworthiness” with respect to adjudicative 
outcomes as well.  To the extent that our reactions regarding 
blameworthiness can be anticipated and manipulated, our conclusions 
regarding the application of contract doctrine are affected as well. 
One of the related critiques of behavioral explanations of law is that 
institutional reforms proposed based on judgment biases may not take into 
account institutional limitations.
172
  If a broader contextual review of 
contracts will be permitted or tolerated, for example, it should be based on 
carefully considered empirical evidence that such a review would actually 
result in “better” adjudication, of which none is offered here.
173
  In addition, 
any reforms proposed that would put additional decision-making authority 
in the hands of others, such as creating and monitoring standards regarding 
the inclusion of additional contextual contract evidence (besides the written 
contract), would rely on individuals who also may be subject to the same 
cognitive judgment limitations.
174
  It therefore is not necessarily desirable 
 
 171.  See id. at 187 (“In most circumstances, we should recognizes we are stuck with 
trade-offs, proceed with a sensible discussion of what we value, and then set a decision 
threshold accordingly”) (citation omitted).  Hastie and Dawes suggest “thinking harder 
about values, rather than accuracy,” and any associated “difficulties must not divert us from 
trying to think harder, more systematically, and from multiple perspectives about the 
unavoidable trade-offs.”  Id. at 187–88; see also Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 170, 
at 1489 (suggesting that a “behavioral approach imposes discipline on economic theorizing 
because assumptions cannot be imported at will”). 
 172.  Isacharoff, supra note 75, at 1743 (“[T]he behavioral model’s focus on the 
individual actor has not yet successfully grappled with the complex institutional settings 
through which law operates.”).  Issacharoff goes on to critique proffered solutions in other 
contexts to the effect of behavioral biases and judgment heuristics that lack evidence of 
effectiveness.  Id. at 1743-45; see also Langevoort, supra note 30, at 701 (“Both judicial and 
regulator policy can readily suffer from their own self-serving influence and illusion of 
control, overestimating the likely benefit to flow from their chosen regulatory strategies, 
underestimating their costs.”); Bainbridge, supra note 77, at 1059 (“Behavioral economics 
itself offers additional reasons to doubt the capacity of the law as agent for social change.”). 
 173.  See Bainbridge, supra note 77, at 1028 (arguing that behavioral economics’ “limits 
and [] liberty implications suggest that it also is a tool that needs to be used thoughtfully and 
cautiously”); Sophie Roell, Jonah Lehrer on Decision-Making, THE BROWSER, available at 
http://thebrowser.com/interviews/jonah-lehrer-on-decision-making (suggesting that the 
pivotal question is how we will turn “behavioral economics into an applied science”) (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
 174.  Issacharoff, supra note 75, at 1745 (suggesting that “[b]ounded rationality should 
not become the pretext for the imposition of an overarching regulatory structure on 
individuals . . . . [T]here is precious little evidence that even professional bodies are immune 
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to promote policies that remove or diminish either of the parties to a 
contract as the decision-maker.
175
 
Nevertheless, “to acknowledge situation is not to surrender to it, but 
rather it is to take a necessary step in gaining some control over it.”
176
  
Accordingly, this Article does not suggest the replacement of individual 
autonomy with respect to contracts nor solutions designed without 
empirical support.
177
  Instead, as described below, contract law reforms 
should recognize the broader contractual context and the implications of 
contextual clues within the written contract for adjudicators in addition to 
the contracting parties themselves. 
One minimalist suggestion in this Article is that contract law reforms, 
when proffered, should be scrutinized for their likely effect not only on the 
contracting parties but also upon the ex post adjudicators examining the 
contracts.
178
  If a reform can be seen as portraying an inaccurate picture of 
the contracting context or otherwise inaccurately or improperly reinforcing 
a particular depiction of the contracting context, then such a fact should be 
 
from the same biases evident in individual decision making”); Park, supra note 3, at 739 
(suggesting that “[t]here is certainly no guarantee that a judge will be immune from 
attribution error in making decisions, including a decision about what might prejudice the 
jury whose voir dire the judge has supervised”). 
 175.  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1165, 1225 (2003) (“Paternalistic constraints on choice cannot be justified with 
psychology absent a showing that the costs of privately developing better ways to make 
choices are greater than the costs of restricting individual choice.”); see, e.g., Zacks, supra 
note 36, at 1503 (advocating reforms that do not “supplant the Holder [the contracting party 
that did not prepare the contract] as the ultimate decisionmaker” but instead those that are 
focused on “tempering Holder behavioral biases while at the same time limiting Issuer’s 
[the contract preparer’s] unilateral contracting power.”). 
 176.  Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 10, at 175.  However, “[g]iven the importance of 
consent as a basis for contract enforcement, intervention has greater legitimacy if the 
disadvantaged party’s assent to an onerous term is doubtful . . . . Protection of 
disadvantaged parties who are victims of opportunistic abuses of power morally justifies 
measured intervention.”  Morant, supra note 142, at 938.  This Article has asserted that our 
ability to divine assent can be and is manipulated through the written contract itself, which 
has implications for our perceptions of the actors and their blameworthiness. 
 177.  See, e.g., Hastie & Dawes, supra note 60, at 334 (suggesting that “like Benjamin 
Franklin, we have not tried to tell you what to decide, but rather how to decide”). 
 178.  See Hastie & Dawes, supra note 60, at 187 (“In most circumstances, we should 
recognizes we are stuck with trade-offs, proceed with a sensible discussion of what we 
value, and then set a decision threshold accordingly.”).  Hastie and Dawes suggest “thinking 
harder about values, rather than accuracy,” and any associated “difficulties must not divert 
us from trying to think harder, more systematically, and from multiple perspectives about 
the unavoidable trade-offs.”  Id. at 187–88; see also Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 
170, at 1489 (suggesting that a “behavioral approach imposes discipline on economic 
theorizing because assumptions cannot be imported at will”). 
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weighed against the positive aspects of the reforms.
179
  Such an approach 
would certainly muddy the waters of contract law reform, but again, 
simplicity and predictability should not necessarily be promoted above 
serving other goals of contract law, such as promoting the outcomes 
desired by the contracting parties.  If we can contemplate that contractual 
situations are perhaps more complicated than “I acted, therefore I 
consented to the contract,” then we should correspondingly expect to be 
forced to examine proffered reforms more closely.  When contemplating a 
reform, one should consider the possible responses of the repeat player in 
the contract preparation context as well as the possible adjudicator response 
to a written contract that includes the contemplated reform. 
For example, one reform offered in the past and discussed in this 
Article is to require certain types of contracts to be written in “plain 
English.”
180
  When examining such a reform, one should consider whether 
the adjudicators examining a contract written in plain English are likely to 
be prejudiced improperly by such a presentation.  If, as is suspected, 
adjudicators tend to blame the victim and seek evidence reinforcing this 
belief, then the presentation of a contract in plain English may serve as 
reinforcement that the victim could and should have acted otherwise (and 
presumably, that the adjudicator would have acted otherwise to avoid 
facing the conclusion that such a poor outcome could have happened to 
him or her).
181
  This may be amplified by the hindsight bias, causing the 
poor outcome to be perceived as being easier to predict with the aid of 
hindsight in addition to the plain English presentation of the contract.  The 
 
 179.  See Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 170, at 1489 (suggesting that 
“assumptions about behavior should accord with empirically validated descriptions of actual 
behavior.”); see also Hastie & Dawes, supra note 60, at 160 (suggesting that “judgments are 
likely to be more accurate if the judge can step back, take an outside view, and thinking 
distributionally and probabilistically, even if the thought process is only qualitative”).  
Hastie and Dawes warn against “judging intuitively” because “the mind is drawn to a 
limited, systematically skewed subset of the possible events.”  Id. at 159.  This, of course, 
would be a departure from the dispositionist approach of current legal judgment, which 
presumes and reinforces a belief in the voluntariness of most acts. 
 180.  David M. LaPrairie, Taking the “Plain Language” Movement Too Far: The 
Michigan Legislature’s Unnecessary Application of the Plain Language Doctrine to 
Consumer Contracts, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1927, 1930–33 (2000) (discussing various state 
approaches to the “plain language doctrine”). 
 181.  See Langevoort, supra note 30, at 671 (noting that “[o]ne premise of many anti-
protectionist perspectives is that the usual ‘sophisticated’ investor is—and should be—wary 
and vigilant in sales interactions. . . . Consequently, absent some evidence of incapacity or 
duress (at which point they will simply be declared unsophisticated), fairness dictates no 
more protection for the sophisticated investor than the minimal ‘rules of the game’ to guide 
the process of arm’s length bargaining.”).  Presumably, presentation of a contract in plain 
English would satisfy and reinforce this belief, for a “sophisticated” investor should be 
expected to be able to read and understand such a written presentation. 
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initial presentation of the contract in plain English may also create a 
particular first impression upon the adjudicator, one that may be resistant to 
change.
182
  These effects on adjudicators may not be outweighed by any 
supposed benefit by the plain English to the contracting party, particularly 
if it can be shown that such contracts are not read or understood regardless 
of presentation.
183
 
As a corollary, one should expect less resistance by contract preparers 
to additional contract reforms that seek to modify the contracting context 
within the contract itself, such as reforms to promote plain English.  If, 
indeed, such reforms are largely ineffective ex ante but ex post may 
promote adjudicator judgment biases, these reforms should be welcomed 
by the parties who routinely prepare contracts.
184
 
 
 182.  Hastie & Dawes, supra note 60, 32–33 (discussing the primacy effect).  This may 
be amplified by Reid and Dawes’ general conclusion that expert individuals making 
judgments generally rely on “relatively few cues,” use a judgment process that is self-
reinforcing and that does not filter related but irrelevant information very well.  Id. at 52–53 
n.1. 
 183.  See Leff, supra note 1, at 157 (noting that “some people would sign a contract even 
if ‘THIS IS A SWINDLE’ were embossed across its top in electric pink.”); Meyerson, supra 
note 9, at 612–13 (arguing that “[m]erely using a contract with plain language . . . is not 
sufficient, even though such a contract would somewhat decrease the consumer’s 
information costs”).  But see Tim Loughran & Bill McDonald, Plain English, Readability, 
and 10-K Filings 29, (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://www.nd.edu/~tloughra 
/Plain_English.pdf (finding that “[t]he second question addresses whether the enhanced 
readability in 10-Ks led to different behavior by investors and managers.  In this setting, we 
find strong evidence that behavior changed. Improved readability affected the trading 
patterns of ‘average’ investors and the probability of managers issuing seasoned equity.”). 
 184.  See, e.g, Letter from Am. Bankers Ass’n (May 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/news/DraftForms6111.pdf (letter and comments on 
proposed mortgage reform suggesting that “[t]he draft mortgage forms set forth clearer and 
more comprehensible disclosures that will better serve consumers.  ABA believes these 
forms provide an excellent base to advance toward meaningful reform of the existing 
mortgage disclosure process.”); E-mail from Bianca A. Russo, Managing Dir., J.P. Morgan 
Chase & Co., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 2 (Aug. 2, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-10/s70810-110.pdf (stating “JPMorgan 
Chase strongly supports the public policy goals of improving disclosure and transparency in 
this market and agrees that such improvements are necessary in order to  bring the 
securitization markets back to full health,” although it did criticize particular reforms); 
Letter from Jim Pair, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Mortg. Brokers 24 (Dec. 24, 2009), available 
at https://www.namb.org/images/namb/GovernmentAffairs/2009-12-24%20-
%20NAMB%20Comments%20on%202009%20TILA%20Proposed%20Rule.pdf (outlining 
critiques regarding particular disclosure techniques, although, “NAMB supports efforts to 
provide clearer and more conspicuous consumer disclosures.”); Letter from Paul Schott 
Stevens, Senior Vice President, Inv. Co. Inst., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. 
Comm’n (Mar. 24, 1997), available at 
http://www.ici.org/policy/comments/ci.97_SEC_PLAIN_ENGL_COM.print. 
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CONCLUSION 
Evolving contract law reforms are provocative in that they evince a 
public concern, if narrow and incomplete, about the “situation” of 
contracting.  If we care about contracts being in plain English or providing 
meaningful disclosure to the contracting party, it suggests we are concerned 
about objective manifestations of assent that occur outside of a “proper” 
context.
185
  The issue to date, however, is that reforms appear to be 
ineffective in modifying the actual contracting situation while reinforcing 
existing adjudicative biases.
186
  This, in turn, precludes a deeper and more 
accurate examination of the contracting context.
187
  If we are comfortable 
with reforms that make us feel better after the fact about the contracting 
context (regardless of effectiveness), then we are unlikely to search for 
evidence that the context was not as depicted by the contract’s content and 
presentation. 
Just as it may be relevant in certain contexts that one party has not 
read or attempted to negotiate the contract at all, it also should be relevant 
that the contract will be presented to, and read by, the adjudicator (who is 
similarly subject to decision-making biases).  The contracting context, as it 
exists for the contracting parties as well as how it is presented to 
 
 185.  See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 30, at 627 (arguing for “meaningful risk 
disclosure requirements even when the investor is sophisticated”). 
 186.  Proffered reforms continue to include formatting and disclosure revisions.  See, 
e.g., Warkentine, supra note 8, at 546 (suggesting that a “knowing assent” requirement for 
contracts could be achieved through “bold-faced, extra-large print” disclosure of material 
terms); see also the discussion of plain English reform described in Section II.E supra.  
These reforms, as described above, likely fail to address the underlying situation of 
contracting parties. 
 187.  See, e.g., Kimberley Ayer, Striking a Balance: When to Extend the Right to 
Rescind Under TILA, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 261, 279–80 (2011) (noting that compliance 
with mortgage disclosure statutes did not necessarily protect borrowers, as “[l]enders 
targeted potential borrowers that they thought they could convince to take on a subprime 
loan—people who were relatively unsophisticated and uneducated, who were unlikely to 
read and understand the paperwork accompanying the transaction, and who would not 
understand enough about subprime loans to realize that they simply could not afford to take 
on that kind of financial risk.”); Bainbridge, supra note 77, at 1054 (suggesting that “[i]f one 
wants to prevent issuers from taking advantage of cognitive errors by investors, the 
appropriate place to do so is in the anti-fraud regime not the disclosure regime.”); 
MacDonald, supra note 36, at 89 (“Three decades ago, a consumer could close a mortgage 
with about 5 to 10 pages of documents.  Today it takes almost 200 in most parts of the 
country. . . . At the rate disclosure laws are being enacted, in ten years it will take 300 pages 
to close a mortgage and 50 or more to open a card account.”).  But see Morant, supra note 
142, at 959 (suggesting that “[b]roadening review of preformation and contextual factors, 
particularly within unconscionability’s procedure element, confirms the reality of assent, as 
well as the need to relieve the disadvantaged party of her obligation to perform onerous 
terms of the bargain”). 
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adjudicators, needs to be contemplated beyond the words of the written 
contract.
188
  The adjudicators’ related assessments of blameworthiness, in 
part based on the presentation and formatting of the contract, have 
important implications for contract law doctrine and reforms.  This Article 
suggests that until we develop a more complete and nuanced understanding 
of the contracting context and its adjudicative effect as presented in, and 
manipulated by, the written contract, contract law reforms may be more 
effective at achieving a one-sided, if inaccurate, ex post perception of the 
contracting context instead of substantively achieving the desired reforms. 
 
 
 188.  Hastie & Dawes, supra note 60, at 334 (“When people deliberately scrutinize their 
decisions, they are able to identify and correct their own biases and inconsistencies.”); see 
Morant, supra note 142, at 956, 960 (arguing that those “who interpret the common law of 
contracts can, and should, more probingly evaluate the dynamic of power” and examine, at 
least for fairness purposes, “the full context of the parties’ bargain” within binding 
contracts, which would include “the influences of attitudinal biases, power disparities, and 
opportunism”). 
 
